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Chapter I  
Introduction 
There currently exists a considerable amount of evidence of the correlation of major 
international equity markets (Rouwenhorst 1998 and Schiereck, De Bondt and Weber 
1999) as well as the strikingly common determinants of expected stock returns that 
these markets share (Haugen and Baker 1996).  From these indications, it seems 
quite reasonable to deduce that successful methods of exploiting market inefficien-
cies to attain abnormal profits in one market might translate to similar profits in an-
other similarly behaved market.  This paper focuses on applying a multifactor stock 
screening method called CAN SLIM, which has recorded highly positive abnormal 
returns in the U.S., to the German market, in an attempt to capitalize on these afore-
mentioned ideas.   
CAN SLIM was developed by William O’Neil, a well-known American in-
vestment analyst, and is an acronym with each letter representing a different criterion 
for selecting stocks.  These seven factors are a combination of “hard”, objective and 
able to be programmed in a computer language, and “soft”, of a more subjective na-
ture for which programming is difficult or impossible, characteristics.  However, this 
paper incorporates only the hard factors into the selection approach as it was written 
in collaboration with the Quantitative Research Department of Bankgesellschaft Ber-
lin (BGB), an endeavor aimed at developing a profitable long/short equity selection 
methodology to be implemented into BGB’s trading system.  Since CAN SLIM 
strongly relies on precisely timing the purchase and sale of stocks, executing a CAN 
SLIM screening requires that the entire German CDAX investment universe be 
scanned on a daily basis, after which the portfolios must be adjusted accordingly.  
Considering this volume of data and amount of computation, it is only feasible to im-
plement a programmable approach.  
The organization of this paper is broken into two main parts.  First, Chapter II 
presents the underlying theoretical foundations behind the application and evaluation 
of the CAN SLIM method.  The chapter begins with an overview of the concept of 
market efficiency, followed by a description of different methodologies used to test for 
market efficiency, then explanations of apparent violations of market efficiency and 
lastly, an outline of two popular models for measuring expected return.  Using the 
principles presented in Chapter II, Chapter III continues with an empirical analysis of 
CAN SLIM in the German market.  Before CAN SLIM is directly applied to the 
CDAX investment universe, an initial screening of the hard factors is performed in 
order to determine their relevancy.  After establishing a relationship between these 
factors and stock price, a preliminary CAN SLIM screening is executed, followed by 
a full CAN SLIM screening which introduces the element of timing purchases and 
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sales.  Finally, Chapter IV concludes the paper with a discussion of the results of the 
empirical analysis and various issues that may impact the findings. 
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Chapter II  
Theoretical Foundations 
 
1 Market Efficiency 
Efficiency, in the context of capital markets, is commonly assumed to refer to the in-
corporation of the expectations and information of all market participants into the 
prices of financial assets.  If markets are sufficiently competitive, and therefore effi-
cient, then microeconomic theory states that investors cannot earn abnormal profits 
from their investment strategies.  This concept of an efficient capital market has been 
continuously developed, studied, tested and challenged ever since the French 
mathematician Bachelier introduced the notion in his Ph.D. thesis in 1900.   
In his work, Bachelier recognized that “past, present and even discounted fu-
ture events are reflected in market price, but often show no apparent relation to price 
changes”.  He concluded that commodity prices fluctuate randomly, which was em-
pirically supported by Cowles (1933), however largely ignored until Cootner (1964) 
published Bachelier’s contribution in English. 
The introduction of electronic computers into time series research in the 1950’s 
enabled economists to analyze the behavior of lengthy economic time series, fueling 
research on the topic of efficient markets.  Samuelson (1965) expanded on Bache-
lier’s theory in his article “Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly.”  
This work, considered the beginning of modern economic literature, asserts that “if 
one could be sure that a price would rise, it would have already risen” and explains 
changes in price with the random walk model. 
 
1.1 Random Walk Model 
Although the origins of the random walk model began with Bachelier, Pearson (1905) 
explained a random walk with an analogy to a drunk who staggers in an unpredict-
able and random fashion.  The drunk is just as likely to end up where he began his 
stagger than at any other point.  
More formally, general random walks are stochastic processes satisfying 
  
(II.1) ... 2, 1,       where,
1
0 =+= ∑
=
tZXX
t
k
kt  
 
with independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) increments kZ .  This means that at 
time t, the increment 1+tZ is independent of the past values 0X ,...., tX  so that the best 
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prediction for 1+tX  is simply [ ]1E ++ tt ZX .  With an additional assumption that 
[ ] 0=kZE  for all k, Bachelier postulated “the best prediction for the value tomorrow is 
the value today.” 
 
1.2 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
Widely acknowledged today, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is a historical 
compilation of work, which begins with Bachelier’s foundations.  The EMH has his-
torically been subdivided into three categories based on Roberts’ (1967) classical 
taxonomy of information sets: 
 
Weak form efficiency:  Prices fully reflect historical information of past prices and re-
turns. 
Semi-strong form efficiency:  Prices fully reflect all information known to all market 
participants (public information). 
Strong form efficiency:  Prices fully reflect all information known to any market partici-
pant (public and private information). 
 
From this idea of information sets, Fama (1970) assembled a comprehensive 
review of theoretical and empirical evidence of market efficiency in which he deems 
an efficient market as “a market in which prices always ‘fully reflect’ available informa-
tion.”  In an efficient market, trading on available information fails to provide an ab-
normal return.  In order to prove or disprove the EMH, a model of “normal” returns 
must be specified against which the actual returns can be compared.  Abnormal re-
turns, the difference between the return on a security and its expected return, are 
forecasted using the chosen information set.  If abnormal returns are found to be un-
forecastable or “random”, the EMH is not rejected.  To clarify, abnormal returns 
should not be confused with excess returns, which are defined as the difference be-
tween the actual return and the risk-free rate.   
Implicit to the EMH is the precondition that the cost of information acquisition 
and trading are equal to zero.  However, these costs are clearly positive, driving 
Fama (1991) to revise his definition of the EMH to a weaker and economically more 
sensible version stating “prices reflect information to the point where the marginal 
benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do not exceed marginal 
costs.”  Most recently, Fama (1998) modified his definition once again, an adjustment 
which spawned from the growing body of empirical research of all three forms of the 
EMH.  This definition states that in an efficient market “the expected value of abnor-
mal returns is zero, but chance generates deviations from zero (anomalies) in both 
directions.”   
 Theoretical Foundations 5 
 
Although the EMH has been the central proposition in finance for nearly thirty 
years, the subject of literally thousands of journal articles, there is amazingly still no 
consensus among financial economists whether or not markets are efficient.  While 
Fama’s definitions are arguably the most well known, the EMH can be expressed in a 
number of alternative ways, not all of which are equivalent, with differences that can 
be subtle, technical and esoteric.  Hence, the definition of the EMH is a “moving goal-
post” of sorts, as being tested and challenged.  The methods and problems of testing 
the EMH will be discussed in following sections. 
 
1.3 Testing Market Efficiency 
Before explaining methods of testing each the three forms of market efficiency, it is 
necessary to first clarify the concept by stating that market efficiency is consistent 
with the fair game process of determining prices.  The fair game model simply states 
that there is no way to use information available at time t to earn a return greater than 
that which is consistent with risk inherent in the security. 
The information referred to by the fair game model varies with the type of mar-
ket efficiency being tested.  For weak form tests, information can include past history 
of stock prices, company characteristics, market characteristics and the time of year.  
Tests for weak form market efficiency are, more generally, referred to as tests of re-
turn predictability.  For semi-strong form tests, information is defined as the an-
nouncement of information.  These studies of such announcements are termed event 
studies.  For strong form tests, information refers to all information, both public pri-
vate, that is available to any investor.  Strong form tests aim to reveal whether or not 
investors exist who have superior abilities that allow them to make abnormal profits. 
 The fair game model is a slightly less restricted version of the random walk 
model in that the fair game model does not require returns to be independent nor 
identically distributed over time.  For an example that holds for the fair game model 
but not the random walk model due to this extra i.i.d. assumption, consider a firm that 
increases its debt and risk over successive periods, resulting in increased expected 
and actual returns.  In this case, an obvious correlation will result in the sequence of 
past returns that can be used to predict future returns.  However, since the expected 
return increases due to increasing risk, this information cannot be used to earn an 
abnormal return.   
 Although the EMH is consistent with all three forms of the fair game model 
(and vice versa), the EMH does not share the same relationship with the random 
walk model.  While the EMH holds whenever the random walk hypothesis holds, the 
same is not true for the reverse case.  The random walk process produces i.i.d. re-
turns from an information set of past returns, addressing weak form efficiency only.   
Therefore, the EMH does not necessarily support the random walk hypothesis as the 
EMH is a more general idea, which encompasses all three forms of efficiency. 
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At this point, it is important to clarify the following point that is often a source of 
confusion; if the EMH holds, there is not any implication that the expected return of 
any security is zero.  In fact, one would expect that the return would be positive and 
related to the amount of risk, with the riskier securities offering higher returns.  The 
correct implication is that past information does not reveal anything about the magni-
tude of the deviation of today’s return from the expected return. 
 
1.3.1 Tests of Return Predictability 
As previously mentioned, tests of return predictability test the weak form of the EMH, 
and use historical information to look for patterns in returns that can be taken advan-
tage of to generate profits.  A number of studies have been performed in this area, all 
which search for different types of market inefficiencies.  The majority of literature on 
this topic focuses on studies performed on American markets, including the papers 
from which the information in this subsection was obtained.  To mention each study 
and result is beyond the scope of this paper, however in the remainder of this sub-
section, an overview of the most important findings from various tests of return pre-
dictability will be discussed. 
 
1.3.1.1 Time Patterns 
Time patterns in returns have been extensively researched, resulting in discoveries 
that returns are systematically higher depending on the time of the day, the day of the 
week or the month of the year. The weekend effect refers to the well-documented 
phenomena that the average returns are reliably negative over weekends (from Fri-
day’s market close to Monday’s open)1.  Harris (1986) also found that the decline 
continued through the first forty-five minutes of trading on Monday, after which re-
turns resembled those of any other day.  However, since the weekend effect was first 
documented, it seems to have disappeared of at lest substantially attenuated.  Fur-
thermore, there has been no profitable trading strategy based on the weekend effect 
to date. 
The turn-of-the-year effect describes the pattern that returns in January are 
substantially higher than returns in other months, especially for small-capitalization 
stocks2.   This effect is also referred to as the January effect.  Gultekin (1983) studied 
this effect in seventeen countries including the United States.  He found turn-of-the-
year effects in all seventeen markets, with the most significant effects occurring in 
non-U.S. markets.  Unlike the weekend effect, the turn-of-the-year effect has not 
completely disappeared since it was originally documented which is hard to reconcile 
with the EMH.   
                                            
1
 See Gibbons and Hess (1981) and French (1980). 
2
 See Fama (1991), Keim (1983)  and Reinganum (1983). 
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 Drawing conclusions from the multitude of tests that have discovered time 
patterns in returns is difficult.  However, a few plausible explanations exist.  First, it is 
possible that these patterns are simply random and are bound to be discovered with 
hundreds of researchers examining the same data set.  This phenomenon is called 
data-snooping; it occurs when identical, or at least positively correlated, data is used 
over and over to refine or reiterate results of studies.  Second, it is possible that these 
patterns are induced by market structure and order flow.  Last, perhaps markets are 
inefficient since in an efficient market, these patterns would disappear as soon as 
investors exploited them.  Whatever the reason for these time patterns, in most cases 
no profitable trading strategies exist since the size of the abnormal returns is not 
large enough to outweigh the transaction costs. 
 
1.3.1.2 Predicting Returns From Past Returns 
Tests of return predictability also include tests that check to see if returns can be pre-
dicted from past returns over short-term horizons.  Such tests include correlation 
tests in which correlation coefficients for today’s return and past returns are exam-
ined for the existence of a linear relationship, runs tests which examine the patterns 
in the sign of price changes and filter rules which implement timing strategies of pur-
chasing, selling and short-selling depending on preestablished price barriers.  Al-
though there is some evidence from both correlation and runs tests that a small posi-
tive relationship between today’s and yesterday’s returns exists (Fama 1965), due to 
transaction costs the relationship is too small to be used to generate any profits.  
 
1.3.1.3 Anomalies 
Market anomalies are empirical results that describe the relationship between firm 
characteristics and abnormal returns.  The existence of anomalies is difficult to rec-
oncile with the EMH and could indicate that inefficiencies exist since in an efficient 
market it should not be possible to earn abnormal profits based on observable firm 
characteristics. 
 While several anomalies have been documented in various publications, three 
of the most frequently discussed include the value effect, the momentum effect and 
the size effect.  The value effect refers to the observation that stocks with high book-
to-market values seem to realize positive abnormal returns (Fama and French 1992) 
while the momentum effect describes the phenomenon that recent past winners out-
perform recent past losers (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993).  The size effect anolmaly 
has attracted an especially large amount of attention.  Banz (1981) first documented 
the size effect when he discovered that from 1931-75, the monthly returns of the fifty 
smallest stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange outperformed the fifty largest 
by an average of one percentage point on a risk-adjusted basis, using the capital as-
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set pricing model (CAPM) to estimate expected returns.  Like the weekend effect, the 
size effect has disappeared or at least been dramatically reduced since the initial 
publication of papers that revealed it (Schwert 2003). 
In an attempt to explain the size effect, it is argued that the risk parameter β  
in the CAPM model might be underestimated for small firms. This could be due to the 
fact that small firms are subjected to nonsynchronous trading since they trade less 
often than large firms, thus leading to an underestimation of β  (Roll 1981 and Rein-
ganum 1981).  It could also be that firms that have become small have changed their 
economic characteristics, growing riskier over time since smaller firms have a lower 
survival probability.  Since β  is measured using historical returns, perhaps it does 
not capture the current economic risks  (Christie and Hertzel 1981). 
Another explanation for the size effect and other anomalies is that the model 
chosen to measure expected returns is inadequate.  Under this reasoning, it follows 
that anomalies may seem to exist when firm characteristics contribute to a risk vari-
able that is unrepresented in the model.  Using the size effect anomaly as an exam-
ple, if the β ’s in the CAPM model are systematically underestimated for small firms, 
then the expected returns for small firms calculated from the model would be too low, 
and thus there would seem to be a positive abnormal return when in reality, none ex-
ists.  Once the previously unaccounted for risk variable is taken into account, the re-
lationship between firm characteristics and abnormal returns disappears.  If a model 
is misestimated in such a way, it can account for the presence of anomalies.  This 
discussion of choosing a proper model to estimate expected returns continues in 
Section 1.5. 
Additionally, there are many alternative explanations for the existence of 
anomalies, the first being that such relationships between firm characteristics and 
abnormal returns are not real and can be explained by the data-snooping phenome-
non that was previously described.  This idea is supported by the fact that many of 
the well-known anomalies including the size effect and value effect do not hold up in 
different sample periods.  Many seem to disappear, reverse or attenuate after they 
are documented and analyzed in academic literature (Schwert 2003).  Alternatively, 
the existence of trading costs, which eliminate the profitability of exploiting strategies 
that take advantage of anomalies, can explain the continuing existence (but not the 
origination) of anomalies.  Finally, it is possible that markets are just inefficient. 
 
1.3.1.4 Predicting Long-term Returns from Firm and Market Characteristics 
While trading spreads, commissions and other transaction costs shadow significant 
doubt on whether short-term mispricing, as discussed in Section 1.3.1.2, can be used 
to generate abnormal returns, long-term mispricing poses a greater challenge to the 
EMH.  Many papers have documented a small-degree of predictability in the long-run 
returns on stocks and bonds based on variables of past information relating to stock 
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market levels and the term and risk structure of interest rates.  Examples of such 
variables for which a positive relationship with returns has been found include short-
term interest rates (Fama and Schwert 1977), interest rate term premium (Campbell 
1987), earnings and price of the S&P 500 index (Campbell and Shiller 1988) and divi-
dends and price of the S&P 500 index (Fama and French 1998). 
 The existence of such relationships can be interpreted as market inefficiency.  
On the other hand, it can also be argued that the expected return changes over time 
due to changing business conditions and that these changes can be predicted.  The 
latter explanation using time-varying expected returns could explain such patterns, 
replacing the assumption of abnormal returns, in order to remain consistent with the 
EMH. 
 
1.3.2 Event Studies 
As previously explained, event studies examine the effect of an announcement on 
share price as a test of the semi-strong form of the EMH.  The initial focus of event 
studies was on the speed of incorporation of information into the share price and try-
ing to determine how long this process takes.  However, it is has since been con-
firmed empirically that prices react quickly to announcements and now commonly 
assumed that, given market rationality, the effect of an event will be reflected imme-
diately into share prices.  Therefore, the aim of event studies has shifted to measur-
ing the effects of an economic event on a firm, normally by looking at changes in the 
price of common equity although the prices of other securities can also be examined.   
Since event studies are widely applicable to events including mergers and ac-
quisitions, earnings announcements, issues of new debt or equity and announce-
ments of macroeconomic variables such as trade deficit, there has been a great 
amount of research devoted to event studies in finance.  The following econometric 
methodology consisting of seven steps is commonly used when performing an event 
study with common stock applications3. 
1. Event definition.  This initial step consists of defining the event of interest and 
the event window, the period over which the security prices will be examined.   
In practice, the event window usually consists of two days, the day of and day 
after the announcement, in order to capture price effects which occur after the 
markets close on announcement day. 
2. Selection criteria.  In order to determine which firms to study, selection criteria 
must be defined.  This criteria may contain but is not limited to being listed on 
certain exchanges, being a member of a certain industry, or having a certain 
                                            
3
 Methodology based on outline from Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997). 
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market capitalization.  At this point, any potential biases introduced through 
the sample selection methods should be identified. 
3. Normal and abnormal returns.  In order to determine an event’s impact, the 
abnormal return must be measured.  The abnormal return itε  is the actual re-
turn of the security itR  minus the normal return [ ]tit XR |E  while the normal re-
turn is defined as the expected return if the event did not occur.  Thus, the ab-
normal returns for each firm i in every time period t in the event window are 
represented as: 
(II.2) [ ] |E tititit XRR −=ε  
where tX  is the conditioning information for the chosen normal performance 
model.  To model the normal return, a benchmark model must be chosen.  
Common choices include the market model, multifactor models, CAPM or just 
simply the return on a market index. 
4. Estimation procedure.  After the normal performance model is selected, the 
parameters of the model must be estimated using a subset of data called the 
estimation window.  Typically, the estimation window consists of a predefined 
number of days before but not including the event window. 
5. Testing procedure.  Using the estimated parameters from the previous step, 
the abnormal returns can now be calculated.  A testing framework for the ab-
normal returns should now be defined, including formulating a null hypothesis 
and determining techniques for aggregating the abnormal returns of individual 
firms. 
6. Empirical results.  Results obtained from the defined testing procedure can 
now be presented and further analyzed using various statistical techniques.  
7. Interpretation and conclusions.  Ideally, the empirical results will lead to in-
sights about how the event affects security prices.  Explanations should be 
developed and discrepancies and ambiguities explained. 
 
1.3.3 Testing for Strong Form Efficiency 
Tests for strong form efficiency can focus on two issues:  whether insider trading re-
sults in abnormal returns or if professional investors, analysts and managers have 
profitable information.  When examining insider trading, one would expect that insid-
ers trading on privileged information would purchase before price increase and sell 
before price decreases and test for such patterns.  Alternatively, event study meth-
odology can be employed to test for the presence of abnormal returns earned by in-
siders.  Unless insiders possess superior analytical abilities, any abnormal returns 
must be due to illegal exploitation of insider information.   
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Similarly, examining the abilities of investment professionals can test a hypothe-
sis of strong form efficiency.  High correlations between actual and forecasted returns 
can signal superior abilities.  Many studies have been performed in this area, how-
ever, beginning with earliest studies by Cowles (1933,1944), it is evident that invest-
ment professionals do not beat the market.  Jensen (1968) found that on a risk-
adjusted basis, any advantage that portfolio managers might have is outweighed by 
fees and expenses.  Fama (1991) summarizes similar subsequent studies that find 
that while some mutual funds have achieved small abnormal returns before ex-
penses, pension funds have underperformed passive benchmarks on a risk-adjusted 
basis.  Although the EMH does not rule out small returns before fees and expenses, 
investment managers on average are unable to earn enough to compensate for the 
fees and expenses they incur. 
 
1.4 Problems in Testing Market Efficiency 
In the discussion of anomalies, it was postulated that such observed patterns could 
signal inadequacies of the benchmark model used in measuring abnormal returns as 
opposed to market inefficiency.  This problem is present not only when examining 
anomalies, but in testing any form of the EMH in which a model for calculating ex-
pected returns is used.  Any test of efficiency must assume that the chosen equilib-
rium model correctly defines normal security returns.  Tests in which the EMH is re-
jected could mean that the incorrect equilibrium model has been assumed just as 
well as market inefficiency.  The implication of this situation, called the joint hypothe-
sis problem, is that hypotheses of market efficiency can never be rejected. 
 Selecting an appropriate model is also important when testing market effi-
ciency, however more so for longer-term studies.  In event studies, abnormal returns 
around announcement days are usually large enough so that any measure of ex-
pected return will produce similar results.  Thus, event studies are relatively insensi-
tive to the model used.  However, for studies of longer-term reaction and anomalies, 
the results are heavily dependent on the chosen model.  It follows that in these types 
of studies, controversy over the implications often arises. 
 Biases in tests of efficiency also exist and must be carefully considered when 
evaluating the results and drawing conclusions.  Such biases include data-snooping, 
selection biases and survivorship biases.  Data-snooping, as previously discussed, is 
a bias that is almost impossible to avoid due to the non-experimental nature of eco-
nomics.  Since it is virtually impossible to escape all data-snooping bias in tests of the 
EMH, they should at least be considered as potential explanations for deviations from 
the benchmark model. 
 A selection bias can occur when data availability results in certain subsets of 
stocks being excluded from the analysis.  For example, in studies of analysts’ fore-
casts, access to a historical set of forecasts is often controlled by the investment or-
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ganization for which they work.  Also, organizations that supply prior forecasts are 
likely to be those where the organization knows that their techniques will show supe-
rior information.  Therefore, even if the analysts had no information, academic studies 
are likely to find that the analysts had an advantage, when in fact, the organizations 
supplying the data are the ones whose analysts did well by chance. 
 Survivorship biases are a type of selection bias that occur when selection of 
firms to be studied is based on knowledge concerning past forecasting skill.  In the 
context of mutual funds, survivorship biases refer to the tendency for poor performers 
to drop out while strong performers continue to exist, thus resulting in an overestima-
tion of past returns. 
 Additionally, when testing for market efficiency, one must remember that per-
fectly efficient markets are unrealistic benchmarks that are unlikely to be observed 
practice.  The presence of market frictions including costs of gathering and process-
ing information, illiquidity and nonsynchronous trading patterns justifies, to a small 
extent, the existence of abnormal returns.  Thus, perfect market efficiency should be 
thought of as an idealization against which relative efficiency can be measured. 
   
1.5 Models to Measure Expected Return 
Choosing an appropriate model to generate expected returns is essential when at-
tempting to measure abnormal returns.  In general, models to measure expected re-
turn can be classified into two main categories:  statistical and economic.  Statistical 
approaches are based upon statistical assumptions of asset return behavior and do 
not depend on any economic arguments while economic models incorporate addi-
tional assumptions concerning investors’ behavior.  Economic models are advanta-
geous in the respect that they are able to calculate more precise measures of ab-
normal returns while imposing economic restrictions.  Of the number of different 
available approaches, this section summarizes some of the most popular including 
the market model which falls in the statistical category as well as the CAPM and mul-
tifactor models which represent economic approaches.  
 
1.5.1 Market Model 
Single-index models are statistical approaches that are widely used as benchmarks 
in efficient market tests.  These models assume that co-movement between stocks is 
due to a single common influence or index.  Although single-index models can be 
defined in terms of any influence (e.g., the rate of return on potatoes), the most 
common index chosen is the rate of return on a market portfolio.  This form of the 
single-index model is called the market model which relates the return of any given 
security iR  to the return of the market portfolio mR .  The market model for any secu-
rity i in period t is represented as 
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(II.3) itmtiiit RR εβα ++=     
(II.4) [ ] [ ] 2EVar      ,0E
iitit ε
σεε ==  
 
     where:  
itε  is the zero mean disturbance term,  
iα  is the component of security i’s return that is independent of the  
market’s performance and is a random variable and 
iβ  is a constant that measures the expected change in itR  given mtR . 
 
iα , iβ  and 2iεσ , the parameters of the model, are often obtained from time se-
ries regression analysis.  Both mtR and itε are random variables and the use of regres-
sion analysis guarantees that they will be uncorrelated such that ( ) 0,cov =mtit Rε .  Un-
der general conditions, an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is a consistent 
method for estimating the market-model parameters.  With the assumptions in (II.4), 
OLS is also an efficient estimator.  Departure from these assumptions is discussed at 
the end of the section.  The following visual representation of the time line (Figure 
II-1) of an event study as discussed in Section 1.3.2, defines notation that is needed 
to further explain the estimation procedure of the market model. 
 
 Figure II-1: Time Line for an Event Study 
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Using this notation, where τ = 0 is the event date, τ = T1 + 1 to τ = T2 is the 
event window and τ = T0 + 1 to τ = T1 is the estimation window.  The lengths of the 
estimation and event windows can therefore be represented as L1 = T1 – T0 and L2 = 
T2 – T1, respectively.  It follows that the post-event window will be from τ = T2 + 1 to τ 
= T3 having the length L3 = T3 – T2. 
The observations in the estimation window can be expressed as the following 
regression system of the market model (II.3),  
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A subscript i for X  is included since the estimation window may have timing that is 
specific to firm i.  Thus, using OLS estimation, the parameters of the model are 
 
(II.6) 
( )
[ ] ( ) .'ˆVar 
ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ
2
1
ˆ
''
ˆ
21
1
2
1
i
i
iii
iiii
ii
iiiii
L
ε
ε
σ
σ
−
−
=
−=
′
−
=
=
XXθ
θXRε
εε
RXXXθ
  
 
It is important to note that a less restrictive form of the market model exists 
when the assumption ( ) 0,cov =jtit εε  is not made.  This implies that along with sys-
tematic movements with the market, additional co-movements between securities 
can exist from effects beyond the market (e.g., industry effects).  In this case, the 
market model is an economic model as economic intuition, in part, is used to de-
scribe the covariation of returns between different securities.  However, by departing 
from these assumptions, a different estimation technique other than OLS, such as 
generalized least squares (GLS), should be used to maintain efficiency. 
 
1.5.2 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
Based on Markowitz’s (1959) groundwork that was further developed by Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965), the CAPM became widely used as a benchmark model in 
event studies in the 1970’s.  However, in the last decades, deviations from the CAPM 
have been discovered, supported by the mass of literature published on anomalies, 
and casting doubt on the validity of the restrictions it imposes.  Yet there is much con-
troversy about how the evidence against CAPM should be interpreted as common 
 Theoretical Foundations 15 
 
arguments include that the evidence against the CAPM is overstated due to mis-
measurement of the market portfolio, data-snooping and sample-selection bias.  
Meanwhile, multifactor models that include additional sources of risk such as the 
Fama French (1993) three-factor model and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model have 
become increasingly popular as it is often argued that CAPM does not incorporate all 
of the proper measures of risk.  Despite all of the debate, the CAPM remains a widely 
used tool in finance.  The remainder of this section on the CAPM focuses on defining 
the model followed by its assumptions and econometric estimation, which is applied 
in the empirical portion of the paper. 
The CAPM is an economic model is described as an equilibrium theory in 
which the expected return of an asset is a linear function of its covariance of the re-
turn of the market portfolio.  An important feature of CAPM is that it quantifies a rela-
tionship between risk and return.  More specifically, the CAPM supports the notion 
that risky investments generally yield higher returns than investments free of risk.  
These higher returns can be thought of as a reward for bearing additional risk. 
 The CAPM is based on the principle that investors will optimally hold a mean-
variance efficient portfolio, a portfolio with the highest expected return for a specified 
level of variance.  Additionally, the CAPM has ten underlying assumptions which re-
duce the frictions to the movements of stock prices: 
1. No transaction costs.  There is no cost involved in buying or selling assets. 
2. Assets are infinitely divisible.  Investors can take any position in an investment 
any buy any fraction or value of a stock. 
3. No personal income tax.  The investor is indifferent to the form of the return 
(dividends or capital gains). 
4. Perfect competition.  No single investor can affect the price of a stock by an 
individual action.  Prices are determined by the aggregate of the actions of all 
investors. 
5. Investors base their decisions solely on the standard deviations and expected 
values of the returns on their portfolios.  This is the fundamental idea behind 
the CAPM’s stock selection framework.   
6. Unlimited short sales.  There is no limit of the number of shares that any inves-
tor can sell short. 
7. Unlimited lending and borrowing at the riskless rate.  The investor can borrow 
or sell any amount of funds at the interest rate equal to the rate for riskless se-
curities. 
8. All investors are assumed to define the identical under consideration identi-
cally.  This assumption, along with assumption nine, concerns homogeneity of 
expectations. 
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9. All investors are assumed to have identical expectations.   These expectations 
are based only upon expected returns, variance of returns and correlation 
structure between all pairs of stocks.  
10. All assets are marketable.  All assets, including human capital, can be pur-
chased and sold on the market.   
 
With fr  representing the return on the risk-free asset, the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM 
model for the expected return on asset i is 
 
(II.7) [ ] [ ]( )fmifi rRrR −=− EE β  
(II.8) [ ][ ]m
mi
i R
RR
Var
,Cov
=β . 
 
Here, iβ  is the index of systematic risk, the part of the variance of returns that cannot 
be diversified away.  From (II.7), it is evident that nonsystematic risk, which can be 
diversified away, plays no role in determining the expected return.  Intuition follows 
that if the investor can eliminate all unsystematic risk through diversification, then 
there is no reason why there should be any return for bearing it.  Thus, the investor is 
rewarded only for bearing systematic risk, which is linearly related to the expected 
return.   
 The CAPM can also be applied to portfolios based on the fact that return on 
any portfolio is defined as a linear combination of the returns on the individual assets 
held in the portfolio so that 
(II.9) ∑
=
=
N
i
iip RXR
1
 
     where:  
iX   is the fraction of the portfolio held in asset i and 
N  is the number of stocks contained in the portfolio, 
 
which is subject to the constraint  
(II.10) ∑
=
=
N
i
iX
1
1. 
 
Similarly, the portfolio beta pβ  is a weighted average of the betas of the individual 
assets iβ  where the weights iX  are the fraction of the portfolio invested in each 
stock. 
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     where:  
pβ   is the index of systematic risk for portfolio and 
iβ  is the index of systematic risk for asset i. 
 
Inserting these into the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM model produces 
 
(II.12) [ ]( )fmpfp rRrR −=− E]E[ β , 
 
the portfolio version of CAPM that is frequently used in empirical tests such as in the 
CAN SLIM analysis in Chapter III.  
The Sharpe-Lintner CAPM model has three implications that are often the sub-
ject of empirical tests.  These implications include the ideas that the intercept of (II.7) 
is equal to zero, that β  captures all of the cross-sectional variation of expected ex-
cess returns and that the market risk premium [ ] fm rR −E  is positive.  Common appli-
cations of the CAPM consist of estimating the cost of capital, evaluating portfolio per-
formance and event-study analysis.   
Since the CAPM is a single-period model that does not include time dimen-
sions, in order to perform econometric estimation of the CAPM over time, an assump-
tion must be made concerning time-series behavior of returns.  Therefore, it is as-
sumed that the excess returns are i.i.d. through time and are also jointly multivariate 
normal.  
Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) first used the basic time series model  
 
(II.13) ( ) itftmtiiftit erRrR +−+=− βα  
 
to conduct an extensive time series test of the CAPM.  Letting iZ  represent the return 
on the ith asset in excess of the risk-free rate so that fii rRZ −= , (II.13) becomes 
 
(II.14) itmtiiit eZZ ++= βα  
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from which the beta of the equity iβ  can be estimated using an OLS regression as 
the slope coefficient of the excess-return market model.  Thus, estimating iβ  is a 
process of regressing the realized excess returns in time period t for asset i on the 
left-hand side of the equation on the realized excess returns of the market portfolio 
on the right-hand side of the equation.  Implementation of this model also requires 
two additional inputs:  the market risk premium fm rR −  and the risk-free return fr .  
Typically, for analyses performed on the U.S. market, Standard and Poor’s 500 Index 
is used as a proxy for the market portfolio while the risk-free rate is normally ap-
proximated U.S. Treasury bill rate.  In the following empirical portion of this paper 
which focuses on the German market, the CDAX equity index, a reflection of the 
overall performance of the German equity market, and the London Inter-Bank Offered 
Rate (LIBOR) rate are used, respectively. 
In an efficient market, when (II.14) is estimated on time series data, iα , or pα  
when applied to portfolios, should be equal to zero if the CAPM sufficiently describes 
returns, which is consistent with the first implication discussed above.  pα  is called 
Jensen’s alpha which is a portfolio performance measure defined as the difference 
between the actual excess returns on a portfolio in any particular holding period and 
the expected excess returns on that portfolio which depend on the risk-free rate fr , 
level of systematic risk β  and actual returns of the market portfolio (Jensen 1969).  A 
portfolio’s performance is considered to be neutral if its actual returns are equal to 
those predicted by the CAPM, thus if .0]E[ =pα   A superior portfolio is one that real-
izes returns that are greater than those implied by its level of systematic risk such 
that .0]E[ >pα   It follows that inferior portfolios yield returns that are smaller than 
those implied by its level of systematic risk, therefore .0]E[ >pα   Thus, a non-zero pα  
represents the portion of the return resulting from unsystematic risk, which is unre-
lated to the movement of the market.   
Additionally, the joint hypothesis problem introduces an alternative explanation 
for the existence of a non-zero pα ;the CAPM model is inadequate and does not pro-
duce accurate expected returns.  More specifically, one of the main arguments of this 
explanation is whether the CAPM appropriately represents the risk factors that con-
tribute to the equity’s return.  Therefore, measuring portfolio performance using Jen-
sen’s alpha technique simultaneously tests the portfolio manager’s ability to achieve 
positive abnormal returns as well as the CAPM model itself.  Both explanations 
should be considered when attempting to interpret pα .  Regardless of which model of 
expected returns is used, the joint hypothesis problem is always an issue when test-
ing market efficiency. 
In order to estimate and test (II.14), it is first written as the regression system 
 
(II.15) tmtt Z εβαZ ++=  
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     where:  
tZ   is a (Nx1) vector or excess returns for N assets (or portfolios of 
assets), 
 β  is the (Nx1) vector of betas, 
 mtZ  is the time period t market portfolio excess return, 
 α  is the (Nx1) vector of asset return intercepts and 
 tε  is the (Nx1) vector of asset return disturbances. 
 
It follows that  
 (II.16) 
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Here, µ  is redefined to refer to the expected excess return.  Thus, from maxi-
mum likelihood estimation, which in this case leads to the same estimators as an 
OLS approach, the parameters of the CAPM model are 
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The maximum likelihood estimators, 321  ,..., , mmm ZZZ , which are conditional on the ex-
cess return of the market, have distributions that follow from the assumed joint nor-
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mality of excess returns and the i.i.d. assumption.  The inverse of the Fisher informa-
tion matrix can be used to derive the variances and covariances of the estimators. 
 The conditional distributions of the parameters are 
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The notation ( )Σ,2−TWN  means that the (NxN) matrix ΣˆT  has a Wishart distribution 
with ( )2−T  degrees of freedom and a covariance matrix Σ .  The Wishart distribution 
is a multivariate generalization of the chi-square distribution.   
 The covariance of αˆand βˆ is 
 
(II.19) [ ] Σβα 





−=′ 2
ˆ
ˆ1
ˆ
,ˆCov
m
mµ
T σ
 
 
and Σˆ  is independent of both αˆandβˆ . 
 
1.5.3 Multifactor Models 
As discussed in the CAPM section, empirical evidence exists that indicates that the 
CAPM beta does not completely explain the cross section of expected asset returns.  
The presence of the many documented anomalies suggests that additional risk fac-
tors may be required to adequately produce expected return figures.  Hence, as an 
alternative to the CAPM, different multifactor pricing models are instead often used, 
which attempt to capture non-market influences that cause securities to move to-
gether.   
The Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) introduced by Ross (1976) is a widely 
used multifactor economic model that determines the expected return of an asset 
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based on its covariance with multiple factors, all under an assumption of an absence 
of asymptotic arbitrage.  Hence, the APT is based on the law of one price stating that 
two identical items cannot sell at different prices.  Unlike the CAPM, the APT does 
not require identification of the market portfolio. 
  The standard form of the multifactor model with K uncorrelated (orthogonal) 
factors can be written as  
 (II.20) [ ]
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     where:  
iR   is the return on asset i, 
 ia  is the intercept of the factor model, 
  ib  is a (Kx1) vector of factor sensitivities,  
  f  is a (Kx1) vector of common factor realizations and 
 iε  is the disturbance term.  
 
For a system of N assets,  
(II.21) [ ]
[ ]  E
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where:  
R   is an (Nx1) vector with [ ]′= NRRR Λ21 R , 
  a  is an (Nx1) vector with a  [ ]′= Naaa Λ21 , 
  B  is an (NxK) matrix with B [ ]′= Nbb b Λ21  and  
  ε  is an (Nx1) vector  with [ ]′= Nεεε Λ21 R .  
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the factors account for the common variation in asset 
returns so that the disturbance term ε  for well-diversified portfolios vanishes, which 
requires ε  to be sufficiently uncorrelated across assets.   
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 Using this structure, Ross (1976) shows that in large economies having no 
arbitrage 
 
 (II.22) ΚBλιµ +≈ 0λ    
  
     where:  
µ   is the (Nx1) expected return vector, 
 0λ  is the model zero-beta parameter equal to the risk-free return if 
such an asset exists and 
  Kλ  is a (Kx1) vector of factor risk premia.  
 
The approximation in (II.22) does not produce directly testable results for asset re-
turns.  Hence, in order to restrict and thus, test, the model, additional structure must 
be imposed so that the model is exact.  Several authors have approached this prob-
lem in different manners.  In Connor’s (1984) competitive equilibrium version of the 
APT, the market portfolio must be well-diversified, meaning no single asset in the 
economy accounts for a significant proportion of aggregate wealth, and the factors 
must be pervasive so that investors can diversify away idiosyncratic risk without re-
stricting their choice of factor exposure.  Alternatively, Dybvig (1985) and Grinblatt 
and Titman (1985) investigate the potential magnitudes of the deviations from exact 
factor pricing given structure on the preferences of a representative agent and con-
clude that, given a reasonable specification of the parameters of the economy, theo-
retical deviations from exact factor pricing are likely to be negligible.  Additionally, 
Merton’s (1973) Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (ICAPM) in combination 
with assumptions on the conditional distribution of returns, produces a multifactor 
model in which the market portfolio serves as one factor and state variables serve as 
additional factors.  From this point on in the paper, only multifactor models with exact 
factor pricing will be analyzed such that 
 
(II.23) .   ΚBλιµ += 0λ   
 
 When estimating an exact factor pricing model, it is assumed that the time-
series returns are i.i.d. and jointly multivariate normal.  Since multifactor models do 
not specify the number nor the identification of the factors, the factors must first be 
determined, a process which will be addressed later in this section.  Four versions of 
the exact factor pricing model exist:  (1) Factors are portfolios of traded assets and a 
risk-free asset exists; (2) Factors are portfolios of trades assets and no risk-free asset 
 Theoretical Foundations 23 
 
exists; (3) Factors are not portfolios of traded assets; and (4) Factors are portfolios of 
traded assets and the factor portfolios span the mean-variance frontier of risky as-
sets.  Maximum likelihood estimation can be used to estimate all four versions, which 
can be seen in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997).  Here, only the first case will be 
detailed as this case is applied in the empirical section of the paper. 
 In this case, where the factors are traded portfolios and a risk-free asset ex-
ists, the unconstrained model, K-factor model expressed in excess returns is    
 
(II.24) tKtt εBZaZ ++=  
 
     where:  
tZ   is an (Nx1) vector of excess returns for N assets (or portfolios of 
assets), 
  B  is the (NxK) matrix of factor sensitivities, 
  KtZ  is an (Kx1) vector of factor portfolio excess returns,  
  a  is an (Nx1) vector of asset return intercepts, 
 tε  is an (Nx1) vector of asset return disturbances, 
  Σ  is the variance-covariance matrix of disturbances, 
 KΩ  is the variance-covariance matrix of factor portfolio excess re-
turns and 
 Ο  is a (KxN) matrix of zeros. 
 
For the unconstrained model (II.24), the maximum likelihood estimators are 
equivalent to the OLS estimators 
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For the estimators of the constrained model with a  constrained to be zero, see 
Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997).  
 Factor selection for multifactor models can be performed by using either statis-
tical or theoretical approaches.  In statistical approaches, factors are built from a 
comprehensive set of asset returns using either factor analysis or principal compo-
nent analysis.   Factor analysis aims to minimize the covariance of residual returns by 
estimating the factor sensitivities and then orthogonal factors, which are linear com-
binations of returns, so that portfolios that are perfectly correlated with the factors can 
be constructed.  The resulting factor portfolio returns can be used in all four versions 
of the exact factor pricing model.  The goal of principal component analysis is to re-
duce the number of variables while retaining without losing too much information in 
the covariance matrix, in other words, to reduce the dimension from N asset returns 
to K factors.  Here, the principal components, which are orthogonal linear combina-
tions of asset returns with maximum variance, serve as the factors.  The question 
remains open which approach, factor analysis or principal components, is optimal for 
constructing the model factor.  Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) discuss this issue 
further and provide deeper mathematical insight into both approaches as do Härdle 
and Simar (2003). 
 Theoretical approaches specify factors based on arguments that the factors 
capture economy-wide systematic risks.  Under this approach, factors can include 
macroeconomic and financial market variables or firm characteristics which explain 
differential sensitivity to systematic risks.  Many empirical studies of multifactor mod-
els exist, especially those on theoretical approaches, including that of Chen, Roll and 
Ross (1986) who used intuitive analysis and empirical investigation to develop a five-
factor macroeconomic model.  They selected factors under the logic that the factors 
should explain changes in the discount rate used to discount future expected cash 
flows and forces which influence expected cash flows themselves.  In their model, the 
factors include the yield spread between long and short interest rates for U.S. gov-
ernment bonds, expected inflation, unexpected inflation, industrial production growth 
and the yield spread between high and low grade corporate bonds.  On the firm 
characteristic and financial variable side of theoretical approaches, it has been dis-
covered that variables such as market value of equity, price-to-earnings ratio and 
book-to-market equity, when implemented in combination with a broad-based market 
portfolio, can effectively explain the cross-section of returns.  As previously men-
tioned in the CAPM section, well-known models of this sort include the Fama French 
(1993) three-factor model and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. 
While multifactor models are often capable of providing more explanatory 
power than the single-factor CAPM, their apparent attractiveness should be ap-
proached with caution.  Since the factors are chosen to fit existing data, multifactor 
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models may overfit the data because of the data-snooping bias.  Additionally, multi-
factor models may capture empirical regularities that are due to market inefficiencies 
of investor irrationality. 
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Chapter III  
Empirical Analysis 
 
1.1 The CAN SLIM System 
CAN SLIM is a technique of screening, purchasing and selling individual stocks, 
which was developed by William O’Neil, a well-known American investment analyst, 
mutual fund creator and founder of the “Investor’s Business Daily” newspaper.  The 
CAN SLIM method has attracted much attention in the U.S. and boasts a 704.9% 
return from 1998 – 2003 on its website compared to the 14.6% return of the S&P 500 
during the same period1.     
The CAN SLIM system is based on both fundamental and technical analysis 
of stocks and the market environment, focusing on finding exceptional stocks with 
extremely high-growth potential.  O’Neil developed the CAN SLIM method by ana-
lyzing the 500 U.S. stocks that have increased the most in value from 1953 – 1993 by 
looking for common observable characteristics shared by these stocks before their 
prices skyrocketed.  From this analysis, he determined that these so-called breakout 
stocks, share seven observable characteristics, each which is represented by a letter 
of the CAN SLIM acronym: 
 
    C -  Current quarterly earnings per share.  Target stocks with increases of at least 
20% in the current quarterly earnings report, preferably those whose earnings 
growth has accelerated in the past three quarters.   
    A - Annual earnings per share (EPS).  Look for stocks with consistent growth over 
the past five years, averaging at least 20% annual EPS growth with no single 
year being down. 
    N - New.  Buy stocks of companies with new products, new management or other 
positive significant changes in their industry conditions.  Additionally, buy 
stocks as they reach new price highs and do not buy cheap stocks. 
    S - Supply and demand.  Choose companies with small market capitalization with 
a small or reasonable number of outstanding shares, restricting supply so that 
an increase in demand will result in prices being driven up.  Smaller firms are 
more likely to have innovative, entrepreneurial management teams.   
    L - Leaders.  Buy market leaders and avoid laggards.  Identify the sector and in-
dustry groups with the highest performance and then focus on the best-
                                            
1
 Source:  CAN SLIM website (www.canslim.net) and the AAII Journal, January 2004. 
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performing stocks within that industry.  Concentrate on relative strength (or 
“momentum”).  
    I - Institutional sponsorship.  Select stocks with a few institutional sponsors with 
good performance records but avoid “overowned” stocks. 
  M - Market.  The direction of the market is the most deterministic factor of stock 
prices.  Study the general market trend to help avoid losses in bear markets an 
to be an early-mover at the first signs of a new bull market.   
 
Over 600 institutional investors in the U.S. currently use O’Neil’s investment 
and research services.  However, the CAN SLIM method also targets the individual 
American investor, with its methods broken down into easy-to-understand terminol-
ogy which is presented in books and seminars, on websites and through investment 
services.  O’Neil embraces the American entrepreneurial spirit, himself being a self-
made success story, as he stands by his belief that, “Anyone can do it.  You can do 
it.”  
Despite the ability of the CAN SLIM method to be presented in a simplistic 
manner, its fundamentals are deeply rooted in finance theory and involve the com-
plex issue of market efficiency.  As discussed in the first section, a vast number of 
journal articles have been written on market efficiency, trying to document the exis-
tence of inefficiencies that one can use to exploit the market and make abnormal 
profits.  The success of CAN SLIM seems to indicate that certain inefficiencies exist 
although there is a lack of quantitative research on the CAN SLIM method as a 
whole.  However, individual studies of different market conditions and anomalies, in-
cluding the momentum effect, size effect and E/P ratios, have revealed that abnormal 
returns can be predicted to some extent, providing some academic basis for CAN 
SLIM’s apparent success.  Furthermore, there exists a lack of analysis of the CAN 
SLIM approach outside of the U.S. investment universe, a hole that this paper at-
tempts to partially fill.   
To my knowledge, apart from this paper, the effectiveness of CAN SLIM in 
the German market has not yet been evaluated.  However, there seems to be much 
preliminary evidence for the potential success of CAN SLIM in Germany in the form 
of several published papers.  Notably, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) confirm the ex-
istence of momentum effects which are strongest among small-cap stocks.  Addition-
ally, studies by Fama and French (1992), Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and 
Davis (1994) relate the predictability of future returns to the relative sizes of the cur-
rent stock prices and current values of earnings per share.  While these previously 
mentioned papers do not specifically focus on Germany, Haugen and Baker (1996) 
provide an important link as they find that determinants of expected stock returns are 
strikingly common across major international equity markets, including Germany’s.   
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However, Schiereck, De Bondt and Weber (1999) provide the most compelling 
evidence that CAN SLIM may succeed in the German market.  They performed a 
momentum study in the German market with data from 1961-91 and found that 
long/short momentum strategies seem to be profitable, beating a passive approach of 
investing in the market index, no matter what the state of the economy.  Moreover, 
Schiereck, De Bondt and Weber do not attribute these abnormal returns to misac-
counting for risk, but rather to inefficient markets.  They also find that the size of the 
abnormal returns is substantial, even after accounting for transaction costs.  Rou-
wenhorst (1998), in his more general international approach, also finds strong evi-
dence of medium-term return continuation, which is negatively related to firm size, in 
his analysis of twelve European markets.  Furthermore, he concludes that this out-
come is inconsistent with the EMH.  It is interesting that both of these papers empha-
size that the results of their respective momentum studies are strikingly similar to the 
results of the momentum studies performed on U.S. markets, stressing that the dy-
namics of stock prices in Frankfurt and New York seem to be correlated.  This finding 
hints at possible common factors of price momentum or aspects of behavioral fi-
nance.       
 The remainder of this paper is an empirical study of a modified CAN SLIM 
approach applied to the German equity market.  In the search for the existence of 
abnormal profits, the factors of the CAN SLIM model and their relevancy and appli-
cability to the German market are first evaluated.  Then, historical data from the Ger-
man market is subjected to a CAN SLIM stock screen to test for abnormal profits, 
which, if found, would signal that the CAN SLIM approach has potential to be suc-
cessfully implemented on an ongoing basis in Germany.  However, the results from 
this analysis are not free from the typical problems of an event study, including poten-
tial biases and the joint hypothesis problem which are both explained in the first sec-
tion, making any profits that might be discovered controversial as to whether they 
really exist. 
 
1.2 CAN SLIM Analysis of the German Market 
1.2.1 Investment Universe 
In order to accurately partake in a thorough analysis of the German market, it is nec-
essary to define a broad investment universe consisting of a wide representation of 
securities that is fully reflective of the performance of the overall German equity mar-
ket.  Thus, data from companies listed on the CDAX index were used in the follow-
ing analysis, which covers all German shares admitted to the Prime Standard and 
General Standard segments of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange.  Since the CDAX 
constituents frequently change, the 683 constituents listed on the CDAX as of May 
18, 2005 (see Appendix 1) represent the investment universe referred to throughout 
this analysis.  Although CDAX historical data dates back to the beginning of 1970, 
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this analysis uses stock data from 1980 - 2005 since some segments of data, such 
as earnings per share and cash flow per share, are only consistently available begin-
ning in 1980.  Additionally, all data used is based on prices from floor trading at the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse) as opposed to Deutsche 
Börse’s Xetra electronic trading system prices.  Datastream and the Worldscope da-
tabase are the sources of all data used in this paper.  Lastly, the software program 
EViews was used to perform the econometric analysis in this paper. 
 
1.2.2 Initial Screening of CAN SLIM Factors 
The purpose of the first part of this analysis is to determine the relevancy of two of 
the main CAN SLIM factors, earnings growth and price momentum, and to test for 
and, when possible, quantify, the factors’ relationship with respect to stock price in 
our investment universe.  The first task focused on examining EPS data for all 683 
CDAX stocks since the first two criteria of the CAN SLIM system focus on select-
ing stocks based on quarterly and annual earnings.  However, our German invest-
ment universe differs from the American investment universe in which the original 
CAN SLIM analysis was performed, mainly due to different reporting standards.   
In the U.S., the GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) standard for 
reporting earnings results in EPS data that is more accurate than the EPS data for 
German companies.  The reason for the difference is that the GAAP stipulate exactly 
how EPS figures should be calculated, leaving less room for companies to smooth 
their earnings over successive periods so that they can manipulate the market per-
ception of their firms’ performance.  In Germany, the HGB (Handelsgesetzbuch) 
guidelines for reporting earnings are not as strict and allow companies to create earn-
ings that look better, meaning higher and smoother, to investors, especially in periods 
when there are losses and high earnings volatility.  With an absence of strict account-
ing regulations, some managers may attempt to make financial performance look 
healthier in this way (Ciccone 2002).  For this reason, EPS data for the 683 CDAX 
companies should not be taken at face value, as it is not a reliable factor on which to 
partially base our CAN SLIM selection of stocks.  Instead, cash flow per share 
(CFS) data is used in our analysis as a more accurate measure of a firm’s true finan-
cial state. 
In order to measure market effects in stock price movements, an equally 
weighted benchmark (BM) index is created from the historical returns of the 683 
CDAX constituents from 1980 - 2005.  With the CDAX constituents changing fre-
quently, this technique of calculating a BM index provides a true representation of the 
historical returns of the 683 stocks against which the performance of a CAN SLIM 
portfolio can be measured.  Using this self-created BM partially alleviates a portion of 
the survivorship bias since the BM is an exact index of the average performance of 
the 683 constituents and does not include any extraneous return data.  However, an 
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unavoidable facet of the survivorship bias still exists, due to the unavailability of data 
from former CDAX constituents, since the evaluation and selection universe for 
choosing CAN SLIM stocks includes only these 683 stocks which have successfully 
survived until today.  Thus, some potentially “bad choices” have already been elimi-
nated from potential CAN SLIM selection.  Likewise, using this equally weighted 
BM removes any large-cap bias, which is very important in a CAN SLIM analysis 
targeting small-cap stocks.  This equal-weighting technique allows for superior or in-
ferior performance by small-cap companies to be adequately reflected in the BM in-
dex and, furthermore, provides an accurate basis of comparison for our selected 
CAN SLIM stocks.   
Figure III-1 plots this self-created BM index along with the CDAX index from 
1979 – 2005.  The solid line represents the natural log difference of the BM and the 
CDAX return indices, measured on the right y-axis, in percent difference.  The indi-
ces appear to closely mirror each other through time.  Thus, it is clear that using the 
self-created BM as opposed to the CDAX index as a benchmark in this CAN 
SLIM analysis will not drastically affect the results. 
 
Figure III-1: BM and CDAX Return Indices.  Left Y-axis for BM and CDAX, 
Right Y-axis for natural logarithm.    
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Next, an ordinary least squares (OLS) cross-sectional regression is performed 
to examine the relationship between CFS growth and stock price.  The model  
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     where:  
itP   is the price of security i in year t,  
2+tBM  is the self-created benchmark for year t+2, 
itCFS  is the cash flow per share of security i in year t and  
itε  is the unexplained component of stock i’s return in year t 
 
is used to estimate the parameters α and β.  Thus, this model regresses the market-
adjusted natural log returns on scaled CFS growth.  It is assumed that the CFS data 
for year t is announced in or by April of year t+1, after which the stock is then pur-
chased and held for one year until April of year t+2.  In order to make CFS growth 
comparable for different companies, it is necessary to scale the amount of change in 
CFS by dividing by the price per share at the end of the previous year based on 
Chou’s (1975) method.  It is important to note that this model assumes a CAPM β 
equal to one for all 683 stocks so that subtracting the natural log difference of the BM 
from the natural log return in identical periods removes any market effects.  Due to 
the unavailability of quarterly CFS data, all available annual historical CFS data2 from 
1980 to 2003 was used.    All price data is taken from April 30th of each year to corre-
spond with earnings announcements.   
This regression3 of 4,904 observations yields an adjusted R2 = 0.000045, re-
vealing no discernable relationship between CFS growth and returns (see Appendix 2 
for regression tables).  Even trimming the normalized data to +/- 3 standard devia-
tions does not substantially change the regression results.  The absence of a rela-
tionship between the two variables in equation (III.1) can be also witnessed in the 
scatter plot in Figure III-2 as there is an apparent clumping of CFS growth data 
around zero. 
 
                                            
2
 The CFS data represents the sum of net income and all non-cash charges or credits and includes 
depreciation, amortization of intangibles and deferred taxes but excludes extraordinary items and 
changes in working capital, divided by the number of outstanding shares. 
3
 Due to highly suspect CFS data, the 2001 and 2002 observations for Saltus Technology AG were 
omitted from all regressions in this paper involving CFS data.  
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Figure III-2: Scatter plot of Data Used in Regression of Equation (III.1) 
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 Since data from the entire population of 683 CDAX stocks fails to provide 
any hint of a relationship between CFS growth and returns, the next step in the 
analysis is aimed at finding tail dependence in stocks having the highest and lowest 
CFS growth figures.  First, all 683 stocks are ranked for each year t from 1981 – 2003 
based on their scaled CFS growth figures.  For each year, portfolios of the highest 
and lowest 10% of stocks are formed based on the CFS growth rankings.  Stocks 
with missing data values for a particular year are omitted from the analysis for that 
year.  Appendix 3 displays by year the number of CDAX constituents with available 
price and CFS data.  Next, equally weighted averages of the t+2 year discrete returns 
of the Top 10% and Bottom 10% portfolios are calculated and compared to the 
equally weighted BM index as illustrated in Figure III-3.  Additionally, Figure III-3 
shows the returns from a Long/Short portfolio created from longing the Top 10% port-
folio and shorting the Bottom 10% portfolio. 
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Figure III-3: Same-Year Returns of CFS Growth-Ranked Portfolios 
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 The associated t-statistics, which test whether the returns are reliably different 
that zero, are reported in Table III-1.  The Top 10% portfolio outperforms the BM by a 
mean of 8.60% with a t-statistic equal to 2.99, signaling that portfolios formed from 
the upper decile of each year’s scaled CFS growth figures have a strong tendency to 
produce abnormal returns in year t+2.  This positive performance of the Top 10% 
portfolio is an important indication that helps to substantiate the CAN SLIM stock 
screening performed later in the next section of this paper. 
However, the Bottom 10% portfolio outperforms the mean by 3.87% with a t-
statistic 1.42, failing to reveal any significant relationship between this bottom decile 
portfolio and the t+2 year returns.   The fact that the Bottom 10% portfolio outper-
forms the mean suggests that selecting short portfolios based on CFS growth as the 
sole criterion will not result in positive returns to the investor.   
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Table III-1: t-statistics for Same-Year Returns of CFS Growth-Ranked Portfo-
lios 
mean return (%) standard deviation t-statistic p-value
Top 10% - BM 8.60 13.78 2.99 0.0007
Bottom 10% - BM 3.87 13.09 1.42 0.1702
Long/Short 4.73 15.70 1.44 0.1626
 
 
 Price momentum, a second main CAN SLIM factor, also known as relative 
strength, is based on the idea that returns are predictable and will continue in the di-
rection of the current trend for future periods.  Under this assumption, returns in peri-
ods t and t-1 are positively correlated over time.  In an attempt to quantify this rela-
tionship, a serial OLS regression is performed as a general test of dependence of 
returns on past returns using the model   
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Using all available market-adjusted price data from the 683 CDAX constituents from 
t = 1981 – 2005, 6,360 observations are regressed to produce an adjusted R2 = 
0.034236.  Based on this R2 value as well as β = 0.176175 (significant at 99%) and 
the scatter plot and regression line depicted in Figure III-4, a positive relationship ex-
ists between today’s and yesterday’s returns for the general population of data from 
all 683 stocks.  It is also evident from Figure III-4 that, in addition to the visual trend 
that is confirmed by the regression, there is a large cluster of data points around the 
zero points of both axes, signaling that there are many near-BM market-adjusted re-
turns.  Judging from this apparent lack of extreme data, it might be difficult to select 
stocks with extraordinarily high or low returns that satisfy the CAN SLIM criteria. 
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Figure III-4: Price Momentum Regression using Equation (III.2) 
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Performing this regression again on data that was normalized and trimmed to 
+/-3 standard deviations reveals even less of a trend in the cross-sectional data, 
yielding even a smaller R2 = 0.025418.  The decrease in the R2 value resulting from 
trimming the data indicates that the tail data may be more predictable with respect to 
relative strength.  Therefore, the results of these price momentum regressions sug-
gest that adopting a price momentum strategy for those stocks with extremely high or 
low returns may be able to be exploited to produce abnormal returns.  The following 
momentum study examines this idea in detail.  
 
Figure III-5: Price Momentum Strategy Implementation 
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Subsequently, a price momentum strategy similar to Jegadeesh and Titman’s 
(1993) is implemented in the CDAX investment universe to test for the existence of 
abnormal returns using information contained in the tails of the previous year’s return 
distribution.  In a price momentum strategy, an investor is able to make decisions 
about which stocks to buy or sell based on historical data, employing both long and 
short strategies.  Figure III-5 illustrates the typical scheme of a price momentum 
study, which is next applied to our investment universe.  First, for each year from 
1980 - 2005, all 683 CDAX stocks with available data are ranked based on their 
discrete returns from the past year (t = -1 year).  As previously mentioned, all annual 
price data is from April 30th of each year, which corresponds to the t = 0 date for each 
year’s ranking.  Portfolios of the Top 10% (winners) and Bottom 10% (losers) ranked 
stocks are then formed for each year.  These portfolios are then held for one year (t = 
1 year) after which an equally weighted average of the discrete returns of the Top 
10% and Bottom 10% portfolios is calculated.  Figure III-6 is a plot of the returns of 
the Top 10% and Bottom 10% portfolios in relation to the equally weighted BM return 
as well as the returns of a Long/Short portfolio created from longing the Top 10% 
portfolio and shorting the Bottom 10% portfolio. 
 
Figure III-6: Price Momentum Returns 
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The t-statistics for this price momentum analysis are displayed in Table III-2.  
Here, the price momentum strategy for selecting stocks looks promising as the Top 
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10% and Long/Short portfolios outperform the BM by 13.91% and 16.80%, respec-
tively, and are accompanied by t-statistics of 1.99 and 1.72.  Implementing the short 
strategy alone, however, seems to have a smaller potential for profitability as the Bot-
tom 10% portfolio underperforms the BM by 2.89% with a t-statistic of -0.84.  Al-
though the returns from the Top 10% and Long/Short portfolios are high, so is the 
volatility, which is characteristic to momentum investment strategies.   
 
Table III-2: t-statistics for Price Momentum Returns 
mean return (%) standard deviation t-statistic p-value
Top 10% - BM 13.91 34.86 1.99 0.0575
Bottom 10% - BM -2.89 17.11 -0.84 0.4085
Long/Short 16.80 48.84 1.72 0.0983
 
  
 To further analyze the effectiveness of momentum strategies, the Top 10%, 
Bottom 10% and Long/Short portfolios are next evaluated using a modified version of 
the CAPM (III.3) and the market model (III.4)     
 
(III.3) εβα +−+=− )(  fBMfp rRrR  
(III.4)     εβα ++= BMp RR    
     where:  
 
fr   is the 1-year LIBOR,  
pR  is the return on the portfolio (Top 10%, Bottom 10%, Long/Short), 
BMR  is the return on the equally weighted BM portfolio and  
ε  is the unexplained component of the portfolio’s (excess) return. 
 
The purpose of this procedure is aimed at finding significant positive (Top 10% 
and Long/Short) and negative (Bottom 10%) α ’s, which represent the portion of the 
portfolio’s return that is unexplained by the BM market portfolio’s performance.  Thus, 
the existence of a positive α  means that the portfolio produces better than expected 
risk-adjusted returns.  In effect, these regressions test the weak form of the EMH.  If 
one can achieve abnormal returns by selecting a portfolio based on historical price 
momentum information, then market inefficiency exists. 
Each portfolio (Top 10%, Bottom 10% and Long/Short) is regressed on the 
equally weighted BM portfolio using both models for a total of six regressions.  In all 
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regressions, White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator is 
used to provide correct estimates of the coefficient covariances in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form.   
The significant (at the 90% level) information obtained from these regressions 
is that the Top 10% portfolio produces α = 13.8% using the market model and 13.6% 
using the CAPM.  Additionally, the Long/Short portfolio produces α = 18.3% using the 
market model.  All other α ’s are found to be insignificant.  This information points to 
market inefficiencies in the German market that can be exploited by employing a long 
strategy based on price momentum.  
Lastly, an attempt is made to explain the performance of the CAN SLIM 
Long/Short portfolios, which are selected based on price momentum criteria, by the 
performance of three different Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB)/Tremont hedge 
fund indices:  the Composite Hedge Fund index, the Equity Market Neutral Hedge 
index and the Long/Short Hedge index.  While, as shown earlier in this section, the 
CAN SLIM Long/Short momentum portfolios significantly outperform the BM, the 
returns of the CFS growth Long/Short portfolios are not significant, as indicated by 
the small t-statistic, and therefore are not evaluated in this part of the analysis.   
The motivation behind this portion of the paper centers on the idea that 
long/short approaches are typical hedge fund approaches.  Therefore, it is logical to 
hypothesize that a relationship between the performance of the CAN SLIM 
Long/Short portfolios and different hedge fund indices exists.  In order to test for such 
a relationship, a regression is performed on the following excess return model, 
 
 (III.5) ( ) εβα +−+=− fHFfSL rRrR /  
 
     where:  
 
fr   is the 1-year LIBOR,  
SLR /  is discrete return on the Long/Short momentum portfolio, 
HFR  is the natural log of the holding period return on the specified 
hedge fund index (Composite, Equity Market Neutral or 
Long/Short) in euro,  
ε  is the unexplained component of the L/S portfolio’s excess return. 
 
Analogous to the CAPM, this model employs excess returns, regressing excess 
Long/Short portfolio returns on excess returns of the hedge fund indices.  The identi-
 Empirical Analysis 39 
 
cal Long/Short momentum portfolios built and evaluated in the previous price mo-
mentum analysis are also used here.   
CSFB/Tremont’s hedge fund indices4 are industry standards in hedge fund 
benchmarking and research.  Collaboratively, CSFB and Tremont produce an asset-
weighted index of general hedge fund performance, the CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund 
Index, which is broken into ten sub-indices, each representative of a different hedge 
fund investment style.  The CSFB/Tremont Hedge Fund Index, here referred to as 
the Composite Index, measures the performance of over 400 funds across the ten 
style-based sectors, each having a minimum of $50 million in assets under manage-
ment, a minimum one-year track record and current audited financial statements.  
The Equity Market Neutral Index and the Long/Short Equity Index are two of 
the sub-indices that employ long/short strategies similar to that of the Long/Short 
momentum portfolios.  The Equity Market Neutral Index composes 4.6% of the Com-
posite index and represents an investment strategy designed to exploit equity market 
inefficiencies with equally matched long and short equity portfolios within a single 
country.  These portfolios are designed to be either beta or currency neutral, or both, 
and often apply leverage to enhance returns.  The Long/Short Equity Index com-
poses 25.8% of the Composite index and encompasses a directional strategy involv-
ing both long and short equity-oriented investing.  Here, the objective is not to be 
market neutral but instead to allow managers to shift portfolios from value to growth, 
small- to medium- to large-cap stocks and from a net long position to a net short posi-
tion.  Futures and options are often used to hedge, and these portfolios tend to be 
substantially more concentrated than portfolios of traditional stock funds. 
Only discrete returns of the three CSFB/Tremont indices are available from 
Datastream, so the indices are first reconstructed from the returns and then con-
verted from dollars to euro.  Finally, the natural log of the holding period return of 
each index is calculated, thus representing the HFR term in (III.5).  Each of the three 
regressions using (III.5) is performed using the eleven annual observations of 
Long/Short momentum portfolio returns from April 30th of each year from 1995 – 2005 
and the corresponding HFR values of the respective CSFB/Tremont Composite, Eq-
uity Market Neutral and Long/Short Equity indices.  None of the regressions yield 
significant β ’s, thus the hypothesis of an existing relationship between the excess 
returns of the Long/Short momentum portfolios and the excess returns of the three 
CSFB/Tremont hedge fund indices is rejected in each case.  For the purposes of this 
CAN SLIM analysis, the absence of any relationship is promising since it suggests 
that the CSFB/Tremont hedge funds have factors other than momentum influencing 
their excess returns.  This finding hints that long/short portfolio selection based on the 
                                            
4
 All information about the CSFB/Tremont hedge fund indices was taken directly from the 
CSFB/Tremont website www.hedgeindex.com. 
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CAN SLIM approach is unique from traditional long/short hedge fund approaches 
and, if found to be successful, CAN SLIM might be able to exploit previously un-
tapped inefficiencies within the German market. 
 
1.2.3 CAN SLIM Preliminary Screening 
While the previous section confirms that two of the main CAN SLIM factors, CFS 
growth (substituted for EPS growth) and relative strength, are relevant in the German 
market, at least on the long side, this section goes one step further by implementing 
a series of stock screens in the CDAX investment universe based on these factors.  
Despite the lack of encouraging short-side results in the last section, this preliminary 
CAN SLIM screening is a “mirrored” CAN SLIM approach meaning in addition to 
following O’Neils long side selection criteria, an opposite approach is applied to the 
short side.   
 The first screen is designed to capture CAN SLIM’s “A” (annual earnings 
per share growth) factor, which in this analysis, as previously explained, is substi-
tuted with CFS growth data.  For each year on the long side, the last four absolute 
CFS values must be positive (i.e., when choosing stocks on April 30th in year t then 
CFSt-1, CFSt-2, CFSt-3, CFSt-4 > 0) or else the stock is eliminated from the selection list 
from that year.  For the remaining stocks, the average CFS growth over the past 
three years is calculated and any stocks having less than 20% average annual CFS 
growth are filtered out for that year.   
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Figure III-7:  Returns of Long and Short Portfolios after the Annual CFS Growth 
Screen 
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On the short side, an opposite approach is adopted, however positive absolute 
CFS values are allowed, as firms with long strings of negative CFS values are 
unlikely to exist for long periods of time as they face the possibility of bankruptcy.  
Thus, for the short side, stocks are required to have less than -20% average annual 
CFS growth for the past three years.  If the string of absolute CFS values under con-
sideration for a particular year contains a sign change or zero value, therefore mak-
ing the -20% criteria impossible to observe, the corresponding stocks are kept on the 
short selection list.  Next, the remaining stocks on both the short and long selection 
lists are held for a year after which an equally weighted average of their returns are 
calculated and compared to the BM.  The plot of the Long, Short and Long/Short 
portfolios relative to the BM can be seen in Figure III-7.   
As in the previous section, Table III-3 displays the mean returns, standard de-
viations and t-statistics of the portfolios. In this case, the results are not optimistic as 
all t-statistics are very small and far from being significant.  The Long portfolio even 
underperforms the BM by 0.14%.  All of this evidence hints that the first CAN SLIM 
screen is not effective in terms of providing the investor with positive returns.   
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Table III-3:  t-statistics for Portfolio Returns after Annual CFS Growth Screen 
mean return (%) standard deviation t-statistic p-value
Long - BM -0.14 10.83 -0.06 0.9533
Short - BM -2.35 15.58 -0.69 0.4974
Long/Short 2.21 15.10 0.67 0.5101
 
 
Table III-4 provides an annual breakdown of the number of stocks contained in 
the Long and Short portfolios after the Annual CFS Growth screen.  It is evident that 
the number of remaining stocks drastically increases over time, partially due to the 
fact that many firms did not come to exist until later years and partially due to the fact 
that some data, especially CFS data, is not available for some constituents in the ear-
lier years, despite being listed at that time on the CDAX.  Likewise, the number of 
stocks on the selection lists slightly tapers in recent years, which corresponds to a 
decrease in the overall availability of CFS data (Appendix 3).   
 
Table III-4:  Number of Stocks Remaining after Annual CFS Growth Screen 
where t = Portfolio Building Year 
  
Although quarterly CFS data, as specified by CAN SLIM’s “C” (current 
earnings per share growth, which is substituted for in this anaylsis by CFS growth) 
factor, is not available, the next screen focuses on capturing the “accelerating” 
element of this factor by applying it to annual data.  Only the stocks in the Long and 
Short portfolios that passed through the previous screen are subjected to this 
analysis.  On the long side, the absolute CFS values must be increasing over the 
past three years.  Hence, when choosing stocks on April 30th of year t, then the 
condition CFSt-1 >CFSt-2 >CFSt-3 >CFSt-4 must be fulfilled.  Additionally, the CFS 
growth in the most recent year must exceed the previous year’s CFS growth by at 
least 50%.   
Again, opposite screening requirements are employed on the short side so 
that the past three years must have decreasing absolute CFS figures (i.e., CFSt-1 < 
CFSt-2 < CFSt-3  < CFSt-4) with the CFS growth in the most recent must have 
decreased by at least 50% from the previous year’s CFS growth.  As in the previous 
screen, all stocks having data with sign changes or zero values that prevent the 
evaluation criteria from being computed are allowed to pass through the screen.   
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Long 6 13 12 10 17 21 33 37 52 53 44 48 38 48 60 93 104 139 128 109 114
Short 3 3 5 5 9 6 5 10 14 23 34 35 46 54 57 48 80 160 226 254 263
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Table III-5:  Number of Stocks Remaining after Accelerating CFS Growth Screen 
where t = Portfolio Building Year 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Long 0 4 3 0 2 2 1 5 11 11 6 7 5 7 6 11 12 20 6 10 4
Short 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 2 4 2 2 5 4 2 4 5 17 14 18
 
 
The results of this screen are revealed in Table III-5, which shows the number 
of stocks remaining on each year’s selection list after the accelerating CFS Growth 
screen.  Thus, it is evident that this latest screen eliminates many of the stocks that 
are still present after the first screen.  In fact, there are many years in the first half of 
the historical data range that do not have any stocks included in the portfolios, likely 
due to the data availability issues that were previously discussed.  For this reason, 
the plot of the Long, Short and Long/Short portfolios relative to the BM shown in 
Figure III-8 includes only the returns from 1993 – 2005, years having stocks in both 
the Long and Short portfolios.  By a quick visual inspection of this plot, it is easy to 
observe that the Long portfolios do not seem to regularly outperform the BM, nor do 
the Short portfolios seem to consistently underperform the BM.     
 
Figure III-8:  Returns of Stocks Remaining after Accelerating CFS Growth 
Screen 
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The results of the t-test analysis displayed in Table III-6 confirm what can be 
observed in Figure III-8; the performance of both the Long and Short portfolios is very 
poor.  The t-statistics of all three portfolios when compared to the BM are extremely 
low, and once again, the Long underperforms the BM by an average of 1.91%.  The 
values in Table III-6 are based on the returns from 1985 - 2005 of the Long and Short 
portfolios having at least one stock and the Long/Short portfolios that have at least 
one long and one short stock. 
 
Table III-6:  t-statistics for Portfolio Returns after Accelerating CFS Growth 
Screen 
mean return (%) standard deviation t-statistic p-value
Long - BM -1.91 16.97 -0.49 0.6296
Short - BM -0.01 33.57 0.00 0.9991
Long/Short 0.09 40.73 0.01 0.9935
 
  
The final screen incorporates the “L” (leaders) factor which stipulates that one 
should select the best performing stocks based on their relative strengths, or price 
momentum.  Therefore, this screen adds an additional restriction to the long and 
short selection lists remaining after the previous screen; stocks in the Long portfolio 
must be in the upper quartile of their annual momentum rankings while stocks in the 
Short portfolio must be in the bottom quartile. 
Table III-7 exhibits the number of stocks in each portfolio after applying this 
third and final momentum screen to the stocks that passed through the previous two 
screens.  Applying this latest screen further reduces the number of stocks in both the 
Long and Short portfolios due to the same previously discussed problems of data 
availability and firms not coming into existence until later years. 
 
Table III-7:  Number of Stocks Remaining after Momentum Screen where t = 
Portfolio Building Year 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Long 0 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 5 8 2 2 3 6 2 5 7 9 3 4 0
Short 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 5 1 1 3 5 5 5 7
 
 
The effectiveness of the momentum screen was evaluated following the same 
procedure as with the annual CFS growth and accelerating CFS growth screens.  
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The plot of the returns of the Long, Short and Long/Short portfolios in Figure III-9 fails 
to indicate an obvious trend of the portfolios’ performances relative to that of the BM.   
 
Figure III-9:  Returns of Stocks Remaining after Momentum Screen 
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The accompanying t-test results found in Table III-8 include far from significant 
t-statistics of Long portfolios that underperform the BM by 2.88% on average and 
Short portfolios that overperform the BM by 0.96% on average.  Additionally, the 
volatility for all portfolios is extremely high for all portfolios.  Once again, the numbers 
in Table III-8 are based on the returns from 1985 - 2005 of the Long and Short portfo-
lios compromised of at least one stock and the Long/Short portfolios that contain at 
least one long and one short stock.  The stocks remaining in the Long and Short 
Portfolios for each year after the three-step preliminary screening can be seen in 
Appendix 4. 
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Table III-8:  t-statistics for Portfolio Returns after Accelerating CFS Growth 
Screen 
mean return (%) standard deviation t-statistic p-value
Long - BM -2.88 29.29 -0.38 0.7091
Short - BM 0.96 53.67 0.06 0.9496
Long/Short -10.60 64.73 -0.54 0.5989
 
 
The results of the CAN SLIM preliminary screening do not lead to an optimis-
tic conclusion; by implementing this three-part stock screen, which integrates three of 
CAN SLIM’s critical factors, there is no sign at this stage in the analysis that CAN 
SLIM will produce abnormal returns when implemented in the German market.  
However, CAN SLIM incorporates more than just the seven selection factors as 
O’Neil also stipulates exactly when to buy the stocks and suggests a strict adherence 
to a pre-defined stop loss rule.  The next section applies these additional criteria to 
the stock selection lists. 
 
1.2.4 CAN SLIM Full Screening 
Despite the less than stellar outlook reached after the preliminary screening in the 
previous section, this section still aims to find abnormal returns with the addition of 
O’Neil’s buy criterion and stop loss rule.  O’Neil stipulates that as a part of CAN 
SLIM’s “N” (new) factor, stocks should be purchased when they reach new 52- 
week price highs.  He also strongly suggests introducing an 8% stop loss rule to the 
CAN SLIM portfolio as a risk management device. 
 In this part of the analysis, these additional two criteria are applied in an event 
study format to the selection list (as seen in Appendix 4) from last section’s prelimi-
nary screening.  That is, the event is defined as the day that the stocks reach a 52-
week high within the year (April 30th of year t until April 29th of year t+1) that they are 
on the CAN SLIM preliminary screening selection list.  Once the stocks are reach a 
price high, their returns are examined over the event window which is defined as the 
period from the day of the price high until the following April 30th at which time the 
same process begins for the CAN SLIM selection list of the following year.  How-
ever, if at any time during the event window the stock loses more than 8% of its 
value, the stop loss rule is activated and the stock is immediately sold in order to pre-
vent extreme losses.  If no 52-week price high occurs during the year that the stock is 
on the selection list, then the stock is never purchased and is not included in the final 
CAN SLIM portfolios.   
The following process describes the formation of the final CAN SLIM portfo-
lios on the long side only.  As in the preliminary screening, a “mirrored” CAN SLIM 
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approach is applied to the short side.  Here, an event study is performed which is in-
stead triggered by a 52-week price low versus the 52-week price high as for the long 
side.  Likewise, a stop loss rule of greater than an 8% rise in price is substituted for 
the equivalent 8% decline stop loss rule implemented on the long side.  Appendix 5 
lists the stocks remaining for each year in the Long and Short Portfolios after the 
completion of the CAN SLIM Full Screening process as well as the dates that their 
respective positions were opened and closed. 
 
Figure III-10:  Unadjusted Discrete Returns to Investor of Individual Stocks in 
Final CAN SLIM Long and Short Portfolios for all Years 1985 - 2005 
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Next, the discrete returns for all of the stocks remaining in the CAN SLIM 
portfolios were calculated over their respective event windows.  The returns to the 
investor of all stocks in both the Long and Short portfolios for all years are plotted in 
Figure III-10.  From the statistics in Table III-9, it can be seen that the mean return of 
all individual stocks held for the specified dates listed in Appendix 5 in the CAN 
SLIM Long and Short portfolios across all years is 10.98% which is significant at 
99%.  The Short portfolios do result in a negative mean return of -1.67%, but this 
value is highly insignificant with a small t-statistic of -0.32.  
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Table III-9:  t-statistics for Unadjusted Discrete Returns of Individual Stocks in 
Final CAN SLIM Long and Short Portfolios for all Years 1985 - 2005 
mean return (%) standard deviation t-statistic p-value
Long 10.98 26.23 2.78 0.0081
Short -1.67 28.92 -0.32 0.7541
Long/Short 7.21 27.55 2.25 0.0274
 
However, once the individual CAN SLIM stock returns are market-adjusted 
by subtracting a BM of the daily CDAX returns across the same period for which 
each stock was held (as seen in Figure III-11 and Table III-10), it is revealed that the 
Long stocks underperform the BM by 2.06% while the Short stocks over perform the 
BM by 1.71%, with both the Long and Short portfolios having very small t-statistics.   
 
Figure III-11:  Market-adjusted Discrete Returns to Investor of Individual Stocks 
in Final CAN SLIM Long and Short Portfolios for all Years 1985 - 2005 
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Obviously, these results do not support the notion that the CAN SLIM 
method of selecting stocks in the German market results in any positive abnormal 
returns.  In terms of market efficiency in relation to CAN SLIM, this analysis 
suggests that while the success of CAN SLIM in the U.S. may signal market 
inefficiency in the U.S., similar market inefficiencies do not seem to exist in the 
German market.   
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Table III-10:  t-statistics for Market-adjusted Discrete Returns of Individual 
Stocks in Final CAN SLIM Long and Short Portfolios for all Years 1985 - 2005 
mean return (%) standard deviation t-statistic p-value
Long - BM -2.06 22.63 -0.60 0.5491
Short - BM 1.71 27.35 -0.34 0.7345
Long/Short -0.53 24.54 -0.19 0.8531
 
 
  50 
 
Chapter IV  
Conclusion 
From the results of the full CAN SLIM screening procedure, the weak form of the 
EMH cannot be rejected.  However, from the separate CFS growth and momentum 
analyses, it appears that individually, these factors may have some predictive power 
and appear to be promising selection criteria for long portfolios, which is consistent 
with the previous momentum studies in the German market as well as with CAN 
SLIM fundamentals.  Furthermore, the feasibility of selecting stocks based on these 
criteria alone requires further evaluation of the profits after transaction costs.   
The overall results are a bit startling, mainly in the respect that while CAN 
SLIM appears to yield consistently large abnormal profits in the U.S., the results for 
the German market are quite the opposite, despite all of the evidence of the correla-
tion and common determinants of expected stock returns across both countries’ eq-
uity markets.  An interesting topic for further research would be to identify the differ-
ent German and American market characteristics that reveal why CAN SLIM per-
forms very differently in each market.   
It is also possible that the limited size of the CDAX investment universe, 
which does not include micro-cap stocks, compared to the universe of several thou-
sand U.S. stocks used in other CAN SLIM analyses, severely limited the potential 
of the German CAN SLIM analysis, especially when CAN SLIM targets firms with 
small market capitalization.  Also significantly reducing the size of the German in-
vestment universe was the lack of available data, particularly in the earlier years, 
which resulted in stocks with missing data being eliminated from CAN SLIM con-
tention.  Data quality issues might also be an issue, as seen in the distributions of the 
EPS and CFS data.  This observable phenomenon is potentially due to the relaxed 
HGB reporting standards resulting from managers’ attempts to smooth volatile fig-
ures or perhaps due to inaccurate data collecting techniques.  While crosschecking 
techniques verified the accuracy of a sample of data, there is no way of determining 
to what extent the figures were smoothed.      
Alternatively, perhaps the difference in CAN SLIM’s performance can be at-
tributed to the fact that a only scaled down version of CAN SLIM containing the 
quantitative but not qualitative factors was applied in the paper.  Notably, certain sub-
jective or impossible-to-program elements of the “N” (new) factor were omitted in-
cluding new management, new products and new services.  Also, the intra-industry 
analysis included in the “L” (leader or laggard) factor was also not performed here 
and the “I” (institutional sponsorship) factor was not at all considered.  Perhaps, if a 
complete CAN SLIM analysis including all hard and soft elements were carried out, 
the results in the German market would be more similar to those in the U.S. market.  
However, implementing the non-programmable soft factors would require much 
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manual labor on a daily basis, thus making CAN SLIM impractical for an organiza-
tion such as BGB to employ.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1:  CDAX Constituents on May 18, 2005 
 
3U TELEKOMMUNIKATION ARBOMEDIA NET BOSS (HUGO) PREF. 
4MBO INTL.ELT. ARMSTRONG DLW BOV 
A I S ARNDT BRAIN FORCE FINL.SLTN. 
A S CREATION TAPETEN ARTICON INTERGRALIS BRAU UND BRUNNEN 
AAP IMPLANTATE ARTNET BRAUEREI MONINGER 
AAREAL BANK ARTSTOR BREMER VULKAN 
ABACHO ARXES NET.COMMS.CONS. BRILLIANT 
ABIT ATOSS SOFTWARE BROADNET MEDIA COMM. 
ABWL.ROESCH MEDIZIN AUDI BRUEDER MANNESMANN 
AC-SERVICE AUGUSTA TECHS. BUCH DE INTERNET 
ACTION PRESS HLDG. AUTANIA BURGBAD PREF. 
ACTRIS AVA CAATOOSEE 
ADCAPITAL AWD HOLDING CAMELOT 
ADIDAS-SALOMON AXA KONZERN CANCOM IT SYSTEME 
ADLER REAL ESTATE AXA KONZERN PREF. CAPITALSTAGE 
ADLINK INET.MEDIA AZEGO CARGOLIFTER 
ADORI B & L IMMOBILIEN CARL ZEISS MEDITEC 
ADS SYSTEM B A U M BIEN-ZENKER 
ADVA OPTC.NETWORK B I S BOERSEN INFO. BIJOU BRIGITTE 
ADV.PHOTONICS TECHS. BAADER WERTPAH. BILFINGER BERGER 
ADVANCED MEDIEN BABCOCK BORSIG BILTRAIN 
AGIPLAN TECHNOSOFT BABCOCK BSH BINTEC COMMUNICATIONS 
AGIV REAL ESTATE BALDA BIODATA INFO.TECH. 
AGOR BANKGESELLSCHAFT BERLIN BIOLITEC 
AHAG WERTPAPIERHANDEL BASF BIOTEST 
AHLERS BASLER BIOTEST PREF. 
AHLERS PREF. BAUVEREIN HAMBURG BIRKERT & FLECKENSTEIN 
AIG INTL.REAL ESTATE BAYER BKN INTERNATIONAL 
AIXTRON BAYER.HYPO-UND-VBK. BMP 
ALBIS LEASING BAYWA REGD. BMW 
ALLBECON BAYWA VINK BMW PREF. 
ALLGEIER HOLDING BBS KRAFTFAHRZEUG PREF. BOEWE SYSTEC 
ALLGEM.ANLAGE VERWALTUNG BEATE UHSE BORUSSIA DORTMUND 
ALLIANZ BECHTLE BOSS (HUGO) 
ALNO BEIERSDORF CASH LIFE 
ALPHAFORM BERENTZEN-GRUPPE PREF. CASH MEDIEN 
ALTANA BERLINER-HAN.HYPBK. CBB HOLDING 
AMADEUS FIRE BERLINER EFFEKTEN CCR LOGISTICS 
AMATECH BERTRANDT CDV SOFTWARE ENTM. 
AMB GENERALI HDG. BERU CE CONSUMER ELECTRO 
ANALYTIK JENA BETA SYSTEMS SOFTWARE CEAG 
ANDREAE-NORIS ZAHN BHS TABLETOP CELANESE 
ANTWERPES BHW HOLDING CELESIO 
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CENIT SYSTEMHAUS DEUTSCHER EISENHANDEL ESSANELLE HAIR GROUP 
CENTROTEC DEUTSCHE EUROSHOP EUROHYPO 
CEOTRONICS DT.HYPBK.HANN.BL. EUROMED 
CEWE COLOR HDG. DT.IMMOBILIEN HOLDING EUROMICRON 
CEYONIQ DEUTSCHE LUFTHANSA EVOTEC OAI 
CINE-MEDIA FILM DEUTSCHE POST F A M E F&M ENTM. 
CINEMAXX DEUTSCHE POSTBANK FARMATIC BIOTECH 
CNV VERMOEGENSVERWALTUNG DEUTSCHE REAL ESTATE FELTEN & GUILL. ENERGIE 
CO DON DEUTSCHE STEINZEUG FIELMANN 
COMDIRECT BANK DEUTSCHE TELEKOM FJH 
COMMERZBANK DEUTZ FLUXX 
COMPUTEC MEDIA DIDIER-WERKE FORIS 
COMPUTERLINKS DIERIG HOLDING FORTEC ELEKTRONIK 
COMTRADE DIS DT.INDUSTRIE SVS. FRAPORT 
CONCORD EFFEKTEN DKM WERTPAH. FREENET 
CONDOMI DR.SCHELLER COSMETICS FRESENIUS 
CONERGY DOUGLAS HOLDING FRESENIUS MED.CARE 
CONSTANTIN FILM DRAEGERWERK PREF. FRESENIUS MED.CARE PREF. 
CONTIGAS DRILLISCH FRESENIUS PREF. 
CONTINENTAL DUERKOPP ADLER FRIATEC 
COR INSURANCE TECH. DUERR FRITZ NOLS GBL.EQ.SVS. 
CORDIER (ROBERT) DVB BANK FROEHLICH BAU 
CPU SOFTWAREHOUSE DYCKERHOFF FROEHLICH BAU PREF. 
CREATON PREF. DYCKERHOFF PREF. FUCHS PETROLUB 
CTS EVENTIM E ON FUCHS PETROLUB PREF. 
CURANUM E-M-S NEW MEDIA FUNKWERK 
CURASAN EASY SOFTWARE GAP 
CURTIS 1000 EUROPE ECKERT & ZIEGLER GARANT SCHUH+MODE PREF. 
CUSTODIA HOLDINGS EDEL MUSIC GCI MANAGEMENT 
CYBIO EHLEBRACHT GEDYS INET.PRODUCTS 
CYCOS EHLEBRACHT PREF. GELSENWASSER 
D LOGISTICS EICHBORN VERLAG GENESCAN EUROPE 
D+S ONLINE EINHELL HANS PREF. GERATHERM MEDICAL 
DAB BANK EISEN & HUETTENWERK GERMAN BROKERS 
DAIMLERCHRYSLER ELEPHANT SEVEN GESCO 
DATA MODUL ELEXIS GFK 
DATADESIGN ELMOS SEMICONDUCTOR GFN PREF 
DATASAVE ELRINGKLINGER GFT TECHNOLOGIES 
DBV-WINTERTHUR HOLDING ELSA GILDEMEISTER 
DCI DATABASE EM TV AG GIRINDUS 
DEAG DEUTSCHE ENTM. EMPRISE MANAGEMENT GLOBALWARE 
DEBITEL ENERGIE BADEN WUERT. GLUNZ 
DEGUSSA ENERGIEKONTOR GLUNZ PREF. 
DEUTSCHE BALATON EPCOS GOLD-ZACK 
DEUTSCHE BANK EPIGENOMICS GONTARD & METALLBANK 
DEUTSCHE BET. ERGO VERSICHERUNG GPC BIOTECH 
DEUTSCHE BOERSE ESCADA GRAMMER 
DT.EFF.&WECHSEL ESCOM GRAPHITWERK KROPFMUEHL 
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GREENWICH BETEILIGUNGEN INIT LEICA CAMERA 
GRENKELEASING INTERNOLIX LEIFHEIT 
GROUP TECHNOLOGIES INTERSEROH LEONI 
H & R WASAG INTERSHOP COMMS. LINDE 
H5B5 MEDIA INTERTAINMENT LINDNER HDG. 
HAITEC INTICOM SYSTEMS LINOS 
HAMBORNER IPC ARCHTEC LINTEC INFO.TECH. 
HANNOVER RUCK. ISION INTERNET LION BIOSCIENCE 
HARPEN ISRA VISION SYSTEM LIPRO AG LOGISTIK 
HAWESKO HLDG. ITELLIGENCE LOBSTER NET.STORAGE 
HEIDELBERGCEMENT IVG IMMOBILIEN LOEWE 
HEIDELB.DRUCKMASCHINE IVU TRAFFIC TECHS. LPKF LASER & ELTN. 
HEILER SOFTWARE IWKA LS TELCOM 
HEINKEL IXOS SOFTWARE LUDWIG BECK 
HELIAD EQUITY PARTNERS JACK WHITE PRD. M & S ELEKTRONIK 
HELKON MEDIA JENOPTIK M-TECH TECHNOLOGIE PREF. 
HENKEL JETTER MAIER & PARTNER 
HENKEL PREF. JUNGHEINRICHPREF. MAINOVA 
HERLITZ K&M MOEBEL MAN 
HERMLE BERTHOLD PREF. K + S MAN PREF. 
HERZOG TELECOM KABEL NEW MEDIA MANAGEMENT DATA 
HEYDE KAESSBOHRER GELAENDE MANIA TECHNOLOGIES 
HIT INTL.TRADING KAMPA-HAUS MANNHEIMER AG HOLDING 
HOCHTIEF KAP-BETEILIGUNGS MARBERT 
HOECHST KARSTADT QUELLE MARSEILLE-KLINIKEN 
HOEFT & WESSEL KAUFHALLE MASTERFLEX 
HOENLE(DR.) KAUFRING MATERNUS-KLINIKEN 
HOLSTEN-BRAUEREI KENVELO MAUSER WALDECK 
HOLZMANN PHILIPP KINOWELT MEDIEN MAX HOLDING 
HORNBACH-BAUMARKT KLASSIK RADIO MAXDATA 
HORNBACH HOLDING PREF. KLEINDIENST DATEN MB SOFTWARE 
HORNSCHUCH KONRAD KLING JELKO DEHMEL MCS SYSTEME 
HSBC TRINKAUS & BURKHD. KLOECKNER-WERKE MEDIA 
HUCKE KNORR CAPITAL PARTNER MEDIA (NETCOM) 
HYMER KOEGEL PREF. MEDIANTIS 
HYPO REAL ESTATE HLDG. KOEHLER & KRENZER FASH. MEDICLIN 
I FAO KOELN.RUCK. MEDIGENE 
I-D MEDIA KOELN.RUCK.GESELL. REGD. MEDION 
IBS KOENIG & BAUER MEDISANA 
IDS SCHEER KOLBENSCHMIDT PIERBURG MENSCH & MASCHIN.SFTW. 
IFA HOTEL & TOURISTIK KONTRON MERCK KGAA 
IKB DT.INDSTRBK. KRONES MET(@)BOX 
IM INTL.MEDIA KSB METRO 
IMW IMMOBILIEN KSB PREF. METRO PREF. 
IN-MOTION KUEHNLE KOPP&KAUSCHPREF MG TECHNOLOGIES 
INDUS HOLDING KUEHNLE KOPP & KAUSCH MICROLOG LOGISTICS 
INFINEON TECHNOLOGIES KULMBACHER BRAUEREI MICROLOGICA 
INFOMATEC INTGRTD.INFO.SYS. LANXESS 
MIFA MITTELDEUTSCHE FAHRRAD-
WERKE 
INFOR BUSINESS SLTN. LECHWERKE MINERALBR.UEB. 
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MINERALBR.UEB.PREF. PFEIFFER VACUUM TECH. RSE GRUNDBESITZ UND BET. 
MIS PFLEIDERER RTV FAMILY ENTM. 
MLP PGAM ADVD.TECHS. RUECKER 
MME ME MYSELF&EYE PHENOMEDIA RWE 
MOBILCOM PHOENIX RWE PREF. 
MOEBEL WALTHER PILKINGTON DEUTSCHLAND SACHSENMILCH 
MOEBEL WALTHER PREF. PIPER SACHSENRING AUTO 
MOENUS PIRONET NDH ST.-GOBAIN OBERLAND GLAS 
MOKSEL A PITTLER MASCHINEN SALTUS TECHNOLOGY 
MOLOGEN PIXELPARK SALZGITTER 
MORPHOSYS PLAMBECK NEUE ENGE. SANACORP PHARAMAHANDEL PREF. 
MOSAIC SOFTWARE PLASMASELECT SANDER JIL PREF. 
MPC MUENCHMEYER CAP. PLENUM SAP 
MUEHL PRODUCT & SER. PONAXIS SAP SYS.INTEGRATION 
MUEHLBAUER HOLDING PONGS & ZAHN SARTORIUS 
MUELLER-LILA LOGISTICS POPNET INTERNET SARTORIUS PREF. 
MUNCH.RUCK.REGD. PORSCHE PREF. SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS 
MVV ENERGIE PORTA SYSTEMS SCHALTBAU HOLDING 
MWB WERTPAPIERHANDELS PREMIERE SCHERING 
MWG-BIOTECH PRIMACOM SCHLOTT GRUPPE 
NEMETSCHEK PRO DV SOFTWARE SCHNEIDER TECHS. 
NESCHEN PROCON MULTIMEDIA SNP SHNDR-NEUREITHER 
NET IPO PRODACTA SCHOEN & CIE 
NET@ PROGRESS-WERK SCHOLZ & FRIENDS 
NETLIFE PROSIEBEN SAT 1 PF. SCHULER PREF. 
NEUE SENTIMENTAL FILM PROUT SCHUMAG 
NEXUS PSB SCHWAELBCHEN MOLKEREI 
NORCOM INFO.TECH. PSI SCHWARZ PHARMA 
NORDDEUTSCHE AFFINERIE PULSION MEDICAL SYS. SCHWEIZER ELT. 
NORDEX PUMA SECUNET SCTY.NETWORKS 
NOVASOFT PVA TEPLA SEKTKELLEREI SCHLOSS WACHENHEIM 
NOVEMBER QSC SENATOR ENTM. 
NUERNBERGER BET.REGD. QUANTE PREF. SER SYSTEME 
OAR CONSULTING R STAHL SERO ENTSORGUNG 
ODEON FILM RATIONAL SGL CARBON 
OHB TECHNOLOGY REAL SHS INFORMATIONS 
ONVISTA REALTECH SIBRA BETEILIGUNGS 
ORBIS REFUGIUM HOLDING SIEMENS 
P & I PERSONAL & INFO REPOWER SYSTEMS SILICON SENSOR 
P&T TECHNOLOGY RHEINER MODEN SIMONA 
P-D INTERGLAS TECHS RHEINMETALL SINGULUS TECHNOLOGIES 
PA POWER AUTOMATION RHEINMETALL PREF. SINNER 
PAION RHOEN-KLINIKUM SINNERSCHRADER 
PANDATEL RHOEN-KLINIKUM PREF. SIXT 
PARAGON RICARDO SIXT PREF. 
PARK & BELLHEIMER RINOL SM WIRTSCHAFTSBERATUNG 
PARSYTEC ROEDER ZELT.UND SERVICE SOFTING 
PC-SPEZIALIST ROHWEDDER SOFTLINE 
PC-WARE INFO TECHS. ROSENTHAL SOFTM SFTW.BERATUNG 
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SOFTMATIC TRIPLAN WEBER (GERRY) INTL. 
SOFTSHIP TRIUMPH INTL. WEDECO WATER TECHNOLOGY 
SOFTWARE TRIUS WELLA 
SOLAR FABRIK TTL INFORMATION WELLA PREF. 
SOLARWORLD TUI WERU 
SOLON FUER SOLARTECHNIK TURBON WESTAG & GETALIT 
SPARTA AG TV-LOONLAND WESTAG & GETALIT PREF. 
SPLENDID MEDIEN UBAG UNTERNEHMER BET. WIGE MEDIA 
SPORTWETTEN UMS UTD.MEDICAL SYS. WINCOR NIXDORF 
SPRINGER (AXEL) UMWELTKONTOR WINKLER + DUENNEBIER 
SPUETZ UNIPROF REAL ESTATE WINTER 
STADA ARZNEIMITTEL UNITED INTERNET WIRE CARD 
STEAG HAMATECH UNITED LABELS WMF 
STO PREF. USU SOFTWARE WMF PREF. 
STODIEK EUROPA IMMOB. UTIMACO SAFEWARE WUENSCHE 
STOEHR UZIN UTZ WUESTENROT & WUERTT. 
STOLBERGER TELECOM VALUE MANAGEMENT YMOS 
STRABAG VARETIS ZAPF CREATION 
STRATEC BIOMEDICAL SYS. VARTA  
STUTT.HOFBRAEU VATTENFALL EUROPE  
SUEDZUCKER VBH HOLDING  
SUESS MICROTECH VCB BEST OF VC  
SUNBURST MRCHNDSG. VCL FILM + MEDIEN  
SUNWAYS VDN VER.DTL.NICKELWERKE  
SURTECO VECTRON SYSTEMS  
SWING ENTM.MEDIA VGT INDUSTRIE  
SYSKOPLAN VILLEROY & BOCH PREF.  
SYZYGY VIVA MEDIA  
SZ TESTSYSTEME VIVACON  
T-ONLINE VIVANCO GRUPPE  
TA TRIUMPH-ADLER VK MUEHLEN  
TAG TEGERNSEEBAHN IM. VOGT ELECTRONIC  
TAKKT VOGT ELECTRONIC PREF.  
TARKETT VOLKSWAGEN  
TC UNTERHALTUNGS VOLKSWAGEN PREF.  
TDS INFORMATIONS TECH. VOSSLOH  
TEAMWORK INFORMATION W E T AUTOMOTIVE  
TECHEM W O M WORLD OF MDCIN.  
TECHNOTRANS AG WALTER  
TELEGATE WALTER BAU  
TELES WALTER BAU PREF.  
TFG CAPITAL WANDERER-WERKE  
THYSSENKRUPP WAPME SYSTEMS  
TIAG TABBERT-INDUSTRIE WASGAU PRD.& HANDEL  
TIPTEL WASHTEC  
TISCON WAVELIGHT LASER TECHS.  
TOMORROW FOCUS WCM BETEILIGUNG  
TRAVEL24.COM WEB DE  
TRIA IT-SOLUTIONS WEBAC-HOLDING  
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Appendix 2:  Regression Tables:  EViews Output 
 
a. Model (III.1)  - CFS growth on market-adjusted returns 
Dependent Variable: AF 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 06/27/05   Time: 16:33 
Sample(adjusted): 1 4904 
Included observations: 4904 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.096858 0.007451 -12.99976 0.0000 
AE -0.012322 0.011158 -1.104346 0.2695 
R-squared 0.000249     Mean dependent var -0.096997 
Adjusted R-squared 0.000045     S.D. dependent var 0.521701 
S.E. of regression 0.521689     Akaike info criterion 1.536918 
Sum squared resid 1334.126     Schwarz criterion 1.539568 
Log likelihood -3766.523     F-statistic 1.219580 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.001574     Prob(F-statistic) 0.269497 
 
b. Model (III.1)  - Normalized CFS growth on market-adjusted returns trimmed to +/-3 standard         
deviations 
Dependent Variable: AH 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 06/27/05   Time: 17:29 
Sample(adjusted): 1 4828 
Included observations: 4828 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.035521 0.009396 3.780578 0.0002 
AG 0.024209 0.028858 0.838921 0.4016 
R-squared 0.000146     Mean dependent var 0.035575 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000061     S.D. dependent var 0.652813 
S.E. of regression 0.652833     Akaike info criterion 1.985423 
Sum squared resid 2056.797     Schwarz criterion 1.988108 
Log likelihood -4790.812     F-statistic 0.703789 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.000350     Prob(F-statistic) 0.401555 
 
c. Model (III.2)  - Price Momentum 
Dependent Variable: J 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 06/22/05   Time: 19:10 
Sample(adjusted): 1 6360 
Included observations: 6360 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.104290 0.007254 -14.37672 0.0000 
K 0.176175 0.011735 15.01300 0.0000 
R-squared 0.034236     Mean dependent var -0.130484 
Adjusted R-squared 0.034084     S.D. dependent var 0.571348 
S.E. of regression 0.561526     Akaike info criterion 1.683998 
Sum squared resid 2004.752     Schwarz criterion 1.686123 
Log likelihood -5353.113     F-statistic 225.3901 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.837711     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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d. Model (III.2)  -  Price Momentum - trimmed to +/-3 standard   deviations 
Dependent Variable: M 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 06/29/05   Time: 13:10 
Sample(adjusted): 1 6115 
Included observations: 6115 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.063110 0.009686 6.515625 0.0000 
N 0.159883 0.012646 12.64279 0.0000 
R-squared 0.025481     Mean dependent var 0.076482 
Adjusted R-squared 0.025322     S.D. dependent var 0.762608 
S.E. of regression 0.752891     Akaike info criterion 2.270534 
Sum squared resid 3465.120     Schwarz criterion 2.272731 
Log likelihood -6940.157     F-statistic 159.8401 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.825137     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
e. Model (III.3):  CAPM - Price Momentum - Top 10% Portfolio 
Dependent Variable: SER04 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/18/05   Time: 16:25 
Sample(adjusted): 1 25 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.138254 0.068913 2.006204 0.0567 
SER02 1.048533 0.199011 5.268732 0.0000 
R-squared 0.404097     Mean dependent var 0.167025 
Adjusted R-squared 0.378189     S.D. dependent var 0.450319 
S.E. of regression 0.355099     Akaike info criterion 0.843777 
Sum squared resid 2.900190     Schwarz criterion 0.941288 
Log likelihood -8.547219     F-statistic 15.59692 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.419152     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000638 
 
f. Model (III.4):  Market Model  - Price Momentum - Top 10% Portfolio 
Dependent Variable: SER03 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/18/05   Time: 16:15 
Sample(adjusted): 1 25 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.136032 0.068002 2.000413 0.0574 
SER01 1.031675 0.179019 5.762949 0.0000 
R-squared 0.406050     Mean dependent var 0.251764 
Adjusted R-squared 0.380226     S.D. dependent var 0.451241 
S.E. of regression 0.355242     Akaike info criterion 0.844585 
Sum squared resid 2.902533     Schwarz criterion 0.942095 
Log likelihood -8.557313     F-statistic 15.72382 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.412368     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000613 
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g. Model (III.3):  CAPM - Price Momentum - Bottom 10% Portfolio 
Dependent Variable: SER06 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/18/05   Time: 16:32 
Sample(adjusted): 1 25 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.032654 0.031748 -1.028548 0.3144 
SER02 1.176629 0.138489 8.496200 0.0000 
R-squared 0.792156     Mean dependent var -0.000368 
Adjusted R-squared 0.783120     S.D. dependent var 0.360923 
S.E. of regression 0.168083     Akaike info criterion -0.652094 
Sum squared resid 0.649797     Schwarz criterion -0.554583 
Log likelihood 10.15117     F-statistic 87.66012 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.768798     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
h. Model (III.4):  Market  Model -  Price Momentum - Bottom 10% Portfolio 
Dependent Variable: SER05 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/18/05   Time: 16:41 
Sample(adjusted): 1 25 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -0.047022 0.029132 -1.614134 0.1201 
SER01 1.171290 0.130475 8.977094 0.0000 
R-squared 0.797138     Mean dependent var 0.084371 
Adjusted R-squared 0.788318     S.D. dependent var 0.365639 
S.E. of regression 0.168227     Akaike info criterion -0.650390 
Sum squared resid 0.650906     Schwarz criterion -0.552879 
Log likelihood 10.12987     F-statistic 90.37747 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.763153     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
i. Model (III.3):  CAPM - Price Momentum - Long/Short Portfolio 
Dependent Variable: SER08 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/18/05   Time: 16:52 
Sample(adjusted): 1 25 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.086549 0.096933 0.892875 0.3812 
SER02 -0.141941 0.310778 -0.456727 0.6522 
R-squared 0.006212     Mean dependent var 0.082654 
Adjusted R-squared -0.036996     S.D. dependent var 0.491667 
S.E. of regression 0.500679     Akaike info criterion 1.530915 
Sum squared resid 5.765624     Schwarz criterion 1.628425 
Log likelihood -17.13643     F-statistic 0.143770 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.198516     Prob(F-statistic) 0.708039 
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j. Model (III.4):  Market Model - Price Momentum - Long/Short Portfolio 
Dependent Variable: SER07 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 07/18/05   Time: 16:55 
Sample(adjusted): 1 25 
Included observations: 25 after adjusting endpoints 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.183054 0.093003 1.968260 0.0612 
SER01 -0.139615 0.294109 -0.474705 0.6395 
R-squared 0.006360     Mean dependent var 0.167393 
Adjusted R-squared -0.036841     S.D. dependent var 0.487914 
S.E. of regression 0.496820     Akaike info criterion 1.515441 
Sum squared resid 5.677093     Schwarz criterion 1.612951 
Log likelihood -16.94301     F-statistic 0.147227 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.208771     Prob(F-statistic) 0.704724 
 
k. Model (III.5):  Hedge Fund Regressions - Composite 
Dependent Variable: LS_MOMPORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 08/16/05   Time: 10:45 
Sample: 1 11 
Included observations: 11 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.265098 0.228812 1.158588 0.2764 
COMPOSITE -1.123567 1.455597 -0.771894 0.4600 
R-squared 0.062092     Mean dependent var 0.207909 
Adjusted R-squared -0.042120     S.D. dependent var 0.703338 
S.E. of regression 0.717998     Akaike info criterion 2.338265 
Sum squared resid 4.639688     Schwarz criterion 2.410610 
Log likelihood -10.86046     F-statistic 0.595821 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.960425     Prob(F-statistic) 0.459964 
 
l. Model (III.5):  Hedge Fund Regressions - Neutral 
Dependent Variable: LS_MOMPORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 08/16/05   Time: 10:46 
Sample: 1 11 
Included observations: 11 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.190610 0.233192 0.817397 0.4348 
NETURAL 0.448111 1.786621 0.250815 0.8076 
R-squared 0.006941     Mean dependent var 0.207909 
Adjusted R-squared -0.103399     S.D. dependent var 0.703338 
S.E. of regression 0.738806     Akaike info criterion 2.395403 
Sum squared resid 4.912509     Schwarz criterion 2.467748 
Log likelihood -11.17472     F-statistic 0.062908 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.396367     Prob(F-statistic) 0.807590 
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l. Model (III.5):  Hedge Fund Regressions – Long/Short 
Dependent Variable: LS_MOMPORT 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 08/16/05   Time: 10:44 
Sample: 1 11 
Included observations: 11 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.200177 0.235022 0.851741 0.4164 
LSE 0.132698 1.252852 0.105917 0.9180 
R-squared 0.001245     Mean dependent var 0.207909 
Adjusted R-squared -0.109728     S.D. dependent var 0.703338 
S.E. of regression 0.740922     Akaike info criterion 2.401123 
Sum squared resid 4.940688     Schwarz criterion 2.473467 
Log likelihood -11.20617     F-statistic 0.011218 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.358096     Prob(F-statistic) 0.917971 
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Appendix 3:  Number of Available Data per Year for the 683 CDAX Constituents 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Price 84 85 85 86 89 95 100 111 120 187 208 227 239
CFS 60 58 64 84 98 101 103 134 174 186 199 209 221
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Price 245 251 265 277 297 328 424 566 654 666 671 672 683
CFS 249 262 272 353 475 563 587 649 632 607 588 395 na
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Appendix 4:  Long and Short Portfolios after CAN SLIM Preliminary Screening 
1984 1985 1986
Long na SCA HYGIENE PRODUCTS E.ON AG
SCHERING AG VOLKSWAGEN
SIEMENS AG
Short na na na
1987 1988 1989
Long na na CELESIO AG
Short na DEUTZ AG na
1990 1991 1992
Long na na AVA ALLG. HANDELS.
CELESIO AG
HORNBACH HOLDING AG
IMW IMMOBILIEN AG
WERU AG
Short na na SCHNEIDER TECHNOLOG
SCHOEN & CIE AG
1993 1994 1995
Long COMMERZBANK AG RHOEN-KLINIKUM AG HORNBACH HOLDING AG
EHLEBRACHT AG RHOEN-KLINIKUM AG PREF VBH HOLDING AG
HORNBACH HOLDING AG
RHOEN-KLINIKUM AG
RHOEN-KLINIKUM AG PREF
RWE AG
SIBRA BETEILIGUNG
VBH HOLDING AG
Short WALTER AG na CEAG AG
SCHLOSS WACHENHEIM
1996 1997 1998
Long RHOEN-KLINIKUM AG BMW RHEIN AG PREF:
RHOEN-KLINIKUM AG PREF BMW PREF VOSSLOH AG
TAG TEGERNSEE FRESENIUS AG
FRESENIUS AG PREF
HEIDELBERGCEMENT AG
MLP AG
Short BHS TABLETOP ADLER REAL ESTATE AG KENVELO AG
BABCOCK BORSIG AG
BHS TABLETOP
PHILIPP HOLZMANN AG
VK MUEHLEN AG
1999 2000 2001
Long BBS FAHRZEUGTECHNIK BHW HOLDING AG ALTANA AG
HSBC TRINKAUS & BURK CINEMEDIA FILM AG HUGO BOSS AG
HYMER AG CONCORD EFFEKTEN AG HUGO BOSS AG PREF
SIXT MLP AG ESCADA AG
SIXT PREF RSE GRUNDBESITZ AG FIELMANN AG
SAP AG PROCON MULTI MEDIA
ZAPF CREATION AG SCHLOTT GRUPPE AG
STADA ARZNEIMITTEL
WEDECO AG WATER TECH
Short M-TECH TECHNOLOGIE BETA SYSTEMS COMPUTEC MEDIA AG
COMPUTEC MEDIA AG JACK WHITE PRODUCT
KAUFRING AG KLEINDIENST DATENTEC
PORTA SYSTEMS
SOFTMATIC
2002 2003 2004
Long BILFINGER BERGER AG STADA ARZNEIMITTEL na
GARANT SCHUH & MODE TARKETT-SOMMER AG
PUMA AG RUDOLF D.S. WELLA AG
WELLA AG
Short GOLD-ZACK ALLBECON AG DBV WINTERTHUR
M+S ELEKTRONIK AG BRILLIANT AG DUERKOPP ADLER
PORTA SYSTEMS VIVANCO GRUPPE AG MARBERT HOLDING AG
WALTER BAU-AG WORLD OF MEDICINE AG PLAMBECK AG
WALTER BAU-AG PREF WCM BETEILIGUNG ROSENTHAL
WCM BETEILIGUNG
WINTER AG
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Appendix 5:  Long and Short Portfolios after CAN SLIM Full Screening 
1985 1989 1992 1993 1994
SCHERING CELESIO CELESIO RHOEN-KLINIKUM RHOEN-KLINIKUM
open 6/19/85 5/5/89 4/30/92 5/12/93 8/8/94
close 4/29/86 4/29/90 6/4/92 4/29/94 4/29/95
return 0.2008 0.5651 -0.0942 0.5742 0.0778
CDAX 0.5243 0.3256 0.0161 0.3250 -0.0849
return - CDAX -0.3235 0.2394 -0.1103 0.2493 0.1627
SCA HYGIENE IMW IMMOBILIEN RHOEN-KLINIKUM PREF. RHOEN-KLINIKUM PREF.
open 5/22/85 9/17/92 5/13/93 10/14/94
close 4/29/86 4/29/93 4/29/94 12/5/94
return 0.6860 0.0395 0.5709 -0.0999
CDAX 0.6533 0.0429 0.3171 -0.0162
return - CDAX 0.0327 -0.0034 0.2538 -0.0838
SIEMENS HORNBACH HLDG PREF HORNBACH HLDG PREF
open 6/12/85 5/4/92 7/9/93
close 7/26/85 8/11/92 4/29/94
return -0.0813 -0.0935 0.1702
CDAX 0.0050 -0.1195 0.2351
return - CDAX -0.0864 0.0261 -0.0649
WERU COMMERZBANK
open 5/18/92 6/16/93
close 4/29/93 4/29/94
return 0.2783 0.1895
CDAX -0.1040 0.2936
return - CDAX 0.3822 -0.1041
EHLEBRACHT
open 10/22/93
close 4/29/94
return 0.3397
CDAX 0.0779
return - CDAX 0.2618
RWE
open 7/20/93
close 4/29/94
return 0.1328
CDAX 0.2066
return - CDAX -0.0738
SIBRA BETEILIGUNGS
open 5/3/93
close 4/29/94
return 0.1623
CDAX 0.3229
return - CDAX -0.1607
VBH HOLDING
open 6/16/93
close 4/29/94
return 0.3209
CDAX 0.2936
return - CDAX 0.0272
SCHOEN & CIE
open 5/5/92
close 11/5/92
return 0.0976
CDAX -0.1779
return - CDAX 0.2755
SCHNEIDER TECHS.
open 10/14/92
close 4/29/93
return -0.2371
CDAX 0.1196
return - CDAX -0.3567
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
L
o
ng
Sh
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
HORNBACH HLDG PREF TAGTEGERNSEEBAHN BMW RHEINMETALL BBS KRAFT PREF
open 6/16/95 4/9/97 5/2/97 5/4/98 6/24/99
close 8/10/95 4/17/97 8/15/97 8/28/98 2/10/00
return -0.0889 -0.1510 -0.0870 -0.0810 -0.0872
CDAX 0.0425 0.0079 0.1681 0.0032 0.3994
return - CDAX -0.1314 -0.1589 -0.2552 -0.0842 -0.4866
RHOEN-KLINIKUM BMW PREF. VOSSLOH HSBC TRINKAUS
open 5/15/96 5/2/97 5/8/98 5/21/99
close 6/5/96 8/18/97 6/23/98 4/29/00
return -0.0953 -0.0886 -0.0304 0.4384
CDAX 0.0136 0.1474 0.0578 0.3665
return - CDAX -0.1089 -0.2359 -0.0882 0.0719
RHOEN-KLINIKUM PREF. FRESENIUS HYMER
open 5/14/96 4/1/98 8/19/99
close 6/5/96 4/29/98 4/29/00
return -0.0920 0.0234 0.0514
CDAX 0.0136 -0.0050 0.3785
return - CDAX -0.1056 0.0284 -0.3270
FRESENIUS PREF.
open 3/31/98
close 4/29/98
return 0.0659
CDAX 0.0040
return - CDAX 0.0619
HEIDELBERGCEMENT
open 5/7/97
close 12/19/97
return -0.0941
CDAX 0.1090
return - CDAX -0.2031
MLP
open 5/21/97
close 4/29/98
return 0.7011
CDAX 0.3477
return - CDAX 0.3534
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
BHSTABLETOP HOLZMANN PHILIPP KENVELO M-TECH TECH PREF.
open 5/21/96 1/22/98 7/16/98 4/30/99
close 4/29/97 2/2/98 4/29/99 6/10/99
return -0.3104 0.1008 -0.2958 0.0947
CDAX 0.2823 0.0492 -0.1262 -0.0342
return - CDAX -0.5928 0.0515 -0.1696 0.1289
ADLER REAL ESTATE
open 12/3/97
close 4/29/98
return 0.0391
CDAX 0.2311
return - CDAX -0.1919
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
L
o
ng
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rt
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BHW HOLDING SCHLOTT GRUPPE GARANT SCHUH PREF STADA ARZNEIMITTEL
open 6/5/00 5/4/01 7/9/02 5/5/03
close 4/29/01 6/21/01 7/12/02 3/19/04
return 0.5850 -0.1205 -0.0959 -0.0814
CDAX -0.2180 0.0013 -0.0511 0.2647
return - CDAX 0.8030 -0.1218 -0.0448 -0.3461
CONCORD EFFEKTEN PUMA TARKETT
open 5/2/00 6/11/02 5/12/03
close 5/26/00 7/8/02 4/29/04
return -0.1378 -0.0881 0.5786
CDAX -0.0961 -0.0313 0.3502
return - CDAX -0.0417 -0.0567 0.2284
MLP WELLA
open 7/6/00 5/28/03
close 12/1/00 7/25/03
return -0.0867 -0.0849
CDAX -0.1088 0.1377
return - CDAX 0.0221 -0.2226
ZAPF CREATION WELLA PREF.
open 5/4/00 8/28/03
close 5/11/00 4/29/04
return -0.1007 0.1409
CDAX -0.0240 0.1436
return - CDAX -0.0766 -0.0027
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
open
close
return
CDAX
return - CDAX
BETA SYSTEMS KLEINDIENST DATEN GOLD-ZACK BRILLIANT DBV-WINTERTHUR HLDG
open 6/8/00 7/2/01 5/7/02 5/7/03 8/25/04
close 4/29/01 11/13/01 4/29/03 7/14/03 9/14/04
return -0.2140 0.1081 -0.7885 0.1333 0.0943
CDAX -0.2064 -0.1660 -0.3858 0.1159 0.0399
return - CDAX -0.0076 0.2741 -0.4026 0.0174 0.0544
COMPUTEC MEDIA COMPUTEC MEDIA M & S ELEKTRONIK VIVANCO GRUPPE DUERKOPP ADLER
open 5/24/00 6/20/01 5/3/02 6/12/03 3/10/05
close 4/29/01 4/29/02 6/4/02 6/13/03 3/31/05
return -0.6804 -0.6033 0.6000 0.1143 0.1207
CDAX -0.1459 -0.1275 -0.0502 -0.0139 0.0012
return - CDAX -0.5345 -0.4758 0.6502 0.1282 0.1195
KAUFRING PORTA SYSTEMS PORTA SYSTEMS WCM BETEILIGUNG WCM BETEILIGUNG
open 7/13/00 5/8/01 5/7/02 11/5/03 2/25/05
close 4/29/01 5/11/01 5/8/02 4/29/04 2/28/05
return -0.0278 0.0937 0.1111 -0.2318 0.0978
CDAX -0.1853 0.0019 0.0244 0.0728 0.0011
return - CDAX 0.1575 0.0919 0.0867 -0.3046 0.0967
SOFTMATIC WALTER BAU MARBERT
open 7/23/01 4/30/02 4/30/04
close 7/26/01 5/6/02 5/6/04
return 0.2111 0.1250 0.1429
CDAX -0.0134 -0.0251 -0.0197
return - CDAX 0.2245 0.1501 0.1625
WALTER BAU PREF. PLAMBECK NEUE ENGE.
open 4/30/02 5/4/04
close 5/6/02 5/6/04
return 0.1386 0.0887
CDAX -0.0251 -0.0212
return - CDAX 0.1637 0.1098
ROSENTHAL
open 1/21/05
close 1/28/05
return 0.1587
CDAX -0.0037
return - CDAX 0.1624
WINTER
open 5/18/04
close 5/24/04
return 0.1358
CDAX 0.0002
return - CDAX 0.1356
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